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INTRODUCTION
It is well known and commonly understood that Louisiana maintains
a mixed or hybrid legal system that blends both elements of common and
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civil law to form its unique juridical landscape.1 Some have argued that
this hybridization allows Louisiana to maintain the “best of both worlds,”2
and indeed in many instances that belief is entirely defensible. Perhaps it
is even so with respect to wills, but there is some doubt. Louisiana’s form
requirements for wills are a curious amalgam of civil and common law
rules. Although the current law, which provides that a will may be
executed in either olographic or notarial form, was premised upon good
intentions and designed with the goal of simplicity in mind, the current
state of affairs has regrettably resulted in law that is artificially and
unnecessarily complex and rigid. It is a unique Louisiana product that has
crystalized in the law and, in practice, results in many unnecessary
intestacies today. It is time for reform.
Only by understanding the Louisiana law on will formalities in the
broader context of both the civil and common law traditions can one see
most acutely the need for revision. To that end, this Article proceeds by
laying out a very brief history of wills against the backdrop of the purpose
of the form requirements for wills. It then utilizes comparative research
from other civil and common law jurisdictions to inform and historically
situate Louisiana’s law and to document the global shift away from
formalism in the will context. The bulk of this Article, however, is spent
dissecting each of the individual requirements necessary for the making of
a will in Louisiana with a goal not only of descriptive assessment but also
of ascertaining whether each requirement is still necessary. To do so, this
Article provides the history of Louisiana’s experience with will
formalities—the law of yesterday—along with a careful elaboration of all
current aspects of the form for wills—the law of today. Before concluding,
this Article also offers a glimpse into electronic wills—the law of
tomorrow—and provides some backdrop for what surely will be a future
issue that Louisiana and other states will have to address. This Article
suggests that many—perhaps most—of the current form requirements for
wills should be reconsidered, and it is hoped that this Article will provide
a basis for discussion of future revision.
I. A (VERY BRIEF) HISTORY OF WILLS IN THE UNITED STATES
Scholars have well documented the development of the American
system of will formalities elsewhere, and only the briefest sketch or outline
1. See, e.g., VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 257–328 (2001).
2. Joachim Zekoll, The Louisiana Private-Law System: The Best of Both
Worlds, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1 (1995).
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will be provided here, mainly for context and as background for
understanding the modern system of will-making in Louisiana.3
Academics have noted that when it comes to will-making, there are
“three core formalities” for traditional attested wills: (1) the writing;
(2) the signature; and (3) the attestation.4 American law on will formalities
has been consistent in those requirements, but some variation has
historically existed among states. State-by-state variation is generally a
result of the differing choices made by states in basing their statutes either
upon the English Statute of Frauds of 1677 or the Wills Act of 1837. The
states that based their laws upon the Statute of Frauds historically required
a writing, a signature, and attestation by three witnesses.5 The Wills Act,
which was enacted over a century later, simplified the attestation
requirement to merely two witnesses, in addition to the writing and
signature requirement, but it also mandated that the testator sign “at the
foot or end thereof.”6 Still other states “cobbled provisions” from each
statute and sometimes added their own flourishes, such as New York,
which requires that a testator “publish” his will by declaring before the
witnesses that the act is his will.7 As will be explained below, Louisiana
was generally immune from the above influences due to its civil law
heritage. In 1952, however, a change was made that brought a common
law style will into Louisiana practice. Although civil law influences still
exist today, Louisiana’s current law on will formalities is heavily
influenced by the above common law concepts.

3. For a recent exposition of this issue, see Bridget J. Crawford, Will
Formalities in the Twenty-First Century, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 269, 274–75.
4. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
148 (10th ed. 2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1999); 2 JEFFREY A.
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 19.3–19.4, at 7–18 (2003);
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ, AND DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 197 (2010).
5. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 149; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f; SCHOENBLUM,
supra note 4, §§ 19.3–19.4, at 7–18; MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 197.
6. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 149; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f; SCHOENBLUM,
supra note 4, §§ 19.3–19.4, at 7–18; MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 197.
7. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 149; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f; SCHOENBLUM,
supra note 4, §§ 19.3–19.4, at 7–18; MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 197.
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A. Functions of Form Requirements
Will formalities serve a number of functions. Most obviously,
requiring that a will be executed with certain formalities serves an
evidentiary function.8 By requiring that a will be written rather than merely
spoken, the law increases the reliability that the effected disposition is
actually the one intended by the decedent. Oral testimony as to the
decedent’s intent is notoriously unreliable because of lapses in memory,
misinterpretations, or deliberate misrepresentations.9 These concerns are
only exacerbated because the decedent—the person best equipped to
confirm his intent and to correct faulty recollections of others—is not
available.
In addition, will formalities also serve a ritual or cautionary function.
In other words, “[e]ven if the witnesses are entirely truthful and accurate,
what is a court to conclude from testimony showing only that a father once
stated that he wanted to give certain bonds to his son John?”10 That is, “the
court needs to be convinced that the statements of the transferor were
deliberately intended to effectuate a transfer.”11 Only those statements that
the decedent actually intended to have effect should be given the effect of
a transfer. By prescribing certain formalities or rituals for wills, the law
ensures that individuals and courts know which statements are to be taken
seriously and which ones are to be disregarded. The formalities for wills
then serve to impress upon the transferor the “significance of his
statements and thus justify[] the court in reaching the conclusion . . . that
they were deliberately intended to be operative.”12
Similarly, there are clearly protective functions of formalities.
Requiring that witnesses attest to the will, for example, serves a
“prophylactic purpose of safeguarding the testator, at the time of the
execution of will, against undue influence or other forms of imposition.”13
This purpose is clearly illustrated by the English Statute of Frauds, which
was enacted at a time when “wills were usually executed on the death bed”
and when a testator’s normal powers of judgment and cognizance were
impaired or improperly influenced.14 In modern times, however, “wills are

8. See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 6–8 (1941).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 10.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 347

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1336

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

probably executed by most testators in the prime of life and in the presence
of attorneys.”15
More recently, some scholars have observed that will formalities serve
a channeling function.16 John Langbein has succinctly expressed the
importance of this idea by stating that “[c]ompliance with the Wills Act
formalities for executing witnessed wills results in considerable
uniformity in the organization, language, and content of most wills . . .
[such that] [c]ourts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was
meant to be a will.”17 This channeling function serves both the interests of
courts in terms of economy of judicial effort and those of the testator who
“does not have to devise for himself a mode of communicating his
testamentary wishes to the court.”18 Although many transactions require
formalities, wills are somewhat unique insofar as they are of particular
importance and contemplate non-adversarial judicial enforcement.19
Other scholars suggest that will formalities also provide an expressive
function.20 Aside from merely disposing of property, a testament can
provide the testator with a unique opportunity to contemplate his mortality
and communicate to his heirs and legatees, in a particularly germane way,
either life lessons or final statements. Wills allow a testator to have one
“last conversation” with his descendants.21 In fact, in an effort to mirror
the dispositive effect of wills, some have taken to exercising so-called
“ethical wills” in an attempt to transmit their values and last wishes to
close relatives.22
These functions—evidentiary, ritual, protective, channeling, and
expressive—are important and not to be dismissed lightly. At the same
time, however, the above purposes should not be used as a shield against
criticism for continued blind adherence to antiquated formalities. James
Lindgren has observed that “[i]n early Bavaria, to convey property one had
to box the ears of young boys . . . . This strange formality served all the

15. Id. at 10.
16. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1975).
17. Id. at 494.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of
Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427 (2012).
21. Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and
Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 696 (2011).
22. Zoe M. Hicks, Is Your (Ethical) Will in Order?, 33 ACTEC L.J. 33
(2008).
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main functions of formalities . . . ,” but it was both “perverse and silly.”23
Ultimately, almost any formality can be justified by the above purposes.
The key, of course, is discovering the balance between promoting the
intent of the testator and doing so at “an acceptable administrative cost.”24
After all, if most—or even many—wills failed for noncompliance with the
formal requirements for execution, the imposed cost would likely be too
high for the achieved benefit; thus, the prescribed rules likely ought to be
reconsidered.
B. The Law of Yesterday: The Development of Louisiana’s Will Forms
Although Louisiana today allows for only two forms of wills—
olographic and notarial—this innovation occurred in the late 1990s. At the
time of its first Civil Code, the Digest of 1808, Louisiana maintained three
distinct types of wills: (1) the nuncupative will; (2) the mystic will; and
(3) the olographic will.25 At this point in time, Louisiana’s law on willmaking was entirely civilian. The Code Napoléon, enacted just four years
before, similarly provided that a “testament may be olographic, or made
by public act, or in the mystic form.”26 In fact, Roman law had recognized
the olographic will since probably the 5th century.27 Louisiana’s new Civil
23. James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1033
(1992).
24. Id. at 1033.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (1808). Louisiana and French law employ the term
“olographic” or “olographe,” whereas some other states and jurisdictions often
employ the “holograph” or “holographic.” This Article employs both terms
interchangeably and generally opts to use the spelling of the jurisdiction being
discussed. For a discussion of the different spellings used to describe handwritten
wills, see Elizabeth R. Carter, The Last Word: This Handwritten Will Is (Not)
Brought to You by the Letter “H,” 31 PROB. & PROP. 64 (2017).
26. CODE NAPOLÉON art. 969 (1804). In correspondence with article 89 of
the 1808 Code, the de la Vergne manuscript cross-references a great number of
civil law sources—including Domat, Pothier—but mainly Spanish and Roman
sources, such as the law of the Las Siete Partidas, the 13th century compilation of
various Spanish laws by Alphonso the Wise. The law of Las Siete Partidas,
however, is not entirely congruent with the law adopted by Louisiana in 1808. See
A REPRINT OF MOREAU LISLET’S COPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN
FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS 226–227 (1971); see also 2 THE LAWS OF
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Partida VI, Title 1, Law 1, at 961–962 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carlton trans.,
1820) (providing that there were two types of wills, nuncupative and in writing).
27. Reginald Parker, History of the Holograph Testament in the Civil Law, 3
THE JURIST 1 (1943).
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Code also “abrogated” the “usage of . . . merely verbal” testaments that
were established by witnesses “without having committed it . . . to
writing.”28 A nuncupative will, a moniker derived from the Latin verb
nuncupare, meaning to call or to take publicly, was so named because of
the public way in which the will was presented. Ironically, nuncupative
wills could be made either by public or private act.29 A nuncupative will
by public act had to be dictated to a notary public in the presence of either
three witnesses residing in the place where the will was executed or five
witnesses residing elsewhere, and then it was read to the testator in the
presence of the witnesses and signed by him and the witnesses.30 No
interruptions or intervening acts were permitted, and the will itself needed
to state the accomplishment of the formalities.31 The nuncupative will by
public act was “the most formal of all wills,” but these wills engendered
“a considerable amount of litigation” and were frequently declared null for
lack of compliance with the many complexities.32 Indeed, commentators
have noted that “some attorneys tend[ed] to shy away from nuncupative
wills by public act because the formalities were of such importance” as to
be raised almost to the level of “substance.”33
The nuncupative will by private act did not involve a notary public.
Rather, this will could be written by the testator or declared by the testator
to be his will or written by another from the testator’s dictation.34 The
writing or declaration needed to occur in the presence of either five
witnesses residing in the place where the will was executed or seven
witnesses residing elsewhere and thereafter signed by the testator and the
witnesses.35 Although the nuncupative will by private act required a
significant number of formalities—indeed, enough to likely discourage its
use—it was “not as formal as the nuncupative will by public act.”36 Most
notably, compliance with the formalities did not need to be stated in the

28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 90 (1808).
29. Id. art. 91.
30. Id. arts. 92–95.
31. Id.
32. Leonard Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1961).
33. Id. at 4.
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 96–97 (1808). The law did, however, contain an
exception relaxing the number of witnesses from five and seven to five and three
for nuncupative wills by private act “in the country.” Id. art. 98.
35. Id. art. 96.
36. Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 4–5.
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will itself.37 Like the nuncupative will by public act, this will was read
before the witnesses, thus destroying any hopes of privacy of the act.38
A mystic will was not open like a nuncupative will. Rather, this will
was closed or secret because it was written by the testator, or caused by
him to be written, and sealed in an envelope, which would then be
presented to a notary and seven witnesses.39 Privacy was preserved
because the testator would merely declare the document to be his
testament, and the notary would “draw up an act of superscription” to be
signed by the notary, the testator, and the witnesses.40 Although the
formalities were fewer for mystic wills than for nuncupative ones, the
mystic will had to be performed—like the nuncupative will by public act—
without intervening acts or interruptions, and the superscription had to
recite compliance with the formalities.41 Debate in the courts, in fact,
existed as whether wax was necessary for the sealing of the mystic will.42
Still, some noted that after having become “practically . . . obsolete,” the
mystic will experienced a resurgence in use because of its capability for
complex estate plans and its private nature.43 One commentator noted that
it “proved to be most useful in a number of instances.”44
Finally, the olographic will, as the name suggests, is “entirely written,
signed and dated with the testator’s hand.”45 It is the simplest will and most
useful for “uncomplicated situations.”46 It does not, however, easily
accommodate sophisticated estate plans or “lengthy trust[s].”47 The
olographic will is a simple, do-it-yourself style will that has existed in
Louisiana from its earliest days.
The above will forms persisted in a relatively stable fashion from 1808
to 1997. In 1898, the requirement for mystic wills was changed from seven
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 5.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 99 (1808).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 5–6.
43. Id.
44. Id. Although Belgian law has since replaced the mystic will, it is still
retained in French law and Italian law today. Walter Pintens, Testamentary
Formalities in France and Belgium, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES 51, 64
(Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J de Waal, & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2011);
Alexandra Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in id. at 133.
45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 103 (1808); see also MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note
4, at 212 (noting that the word “holographic” is derived from two Greek words
meaning “whole” and “written”).
46. Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 10.
47. Id.
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witnesses to three.48 In 1952, a fourth form of will, the statutory will, was
introduced and so called because it was enacted by “statute” rather than by
an amendment to the Louisiana Civil Code.49 This new statutory will was
based upon “the ordinary statutory will which exist[ed] with modifications
in all the common law states.”50 The bill was a product of the efforts of the
Louisiana Bar Association and undeniably modeled not on the law in civil
law jurisdictions but on the laws in other American states.51
The statutory will was not, however, a direct copy of American law at
the time. Indeed, there was no uniform law of wills in other American
states in 1952. Rather, the drafters appear to have made policy choices and
decisions among competing laws throughout the United States and, at the
same time, crafted a product that was unique to Louisiana. For instance,
although most American states in 1952 required only two witnesses for a
will, some required three.52 The final draft of the Louisiana bill opted for
the lesser number to validate the new will and included in place of a third
witness a unique Louisiana requirement that a notary be present.53
Similarly, some American states at the time—and in fact the original draft
of the Louisiana bill—also allowed a previously executed will to be valid
if subsequently acknowledged after execution before witnesses, but the
final product of Act 66 omitted this option in Louisiana.54 Although only
a minority of states in the 1950s required a testator to “signify” that the
document was his will—that is, the so-called “publication” requirement—
the Louisiana drafters chose to include this requirement in the statutory
will, perhaps because of their familiarity at the time with the same
requirement for mystic wills and nuncupative wills by private act.55
Although signing the will was a common requirement throughout the
48. La. Acts No. 88 (1898).
49. La. Acts No. 66 (1952) (enacting LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442–2444). Some
authors have observed that “[i]t is both unexpected and unfortunate that [the
statutory will] was not enacted as an amendment or addition to the Civil Code,
which contains the other methods for making a will.” Louisiana Legislation of
1952, 13 LA. L. REV. 21, 32 (1952).
50. Louise Korns, Comment, The New Louisiana Wills Act, 29 TUL. L. REV.
288, 288 (1954).
51. Id. at 291; see also Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that the bill
was drafted by the Immovable Property, Probate and Trust Section of the
Louisiana Bar Association).
52. Korns, supra note 50, at 291.
53. Id. at 291. Indeed, only recently has the Uniform Probate Code opted to
allow the use of a notary, but in place of, rather than in addition to, two witnesses.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502.
54. Korns, supra note 50, at 291.
55. Id.
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United States, the new Louisiana statute appears to have innovated from
whole cloth the requirement that the testator sign the will on every page.
Louisiana also adopted the minority approach of including a dual presence
requirement that the witnesses signed the will both in the presence of the
testator and each other.56 Perhaps most bizarrely and unlike any state either
then or now, Louisiana enacted into positive law the requirement that the
will contain an attestation clause, in which the witnesses attest in the
document to compliance with the will formalities.57 Common law wills,
known as “attested wills,” merely required some form of “signing which
show[ed] that it [was] done with the intent of acting as a witness”; “a
formal attestation clause [was] not necessary.”58 Although attestation
clauses were not then and are not now uncommon in other states, their
omission is generally not fatal to the existence of the will—unlike in
Louisiana.59
Despite the numerous technicalities and strictures for the new
statutory will, it was heralded at the time—and likely rightly so—as an
important innovation and liberalization of will formalities.60 Olographic
wills, although important, have never been practical for detailed or
complicated estate plans.61 Similarly, nuncupative wills were “highly
technical,” “difficult,” and had to “be read by quite a few witnesses,”
thereby eliminating any hope for secrecy.62 Only the mystic will lent itself
to an estate plan with “complicated . . . provisions which the testator
preferred to keep private.”63 This will too, however, was “technical” and
unforgiving if its formalities were not “rigidly observed.”64
The statutory will was thus an innovation for Louisiana and was
predicted to be “of inestimable help to the attorney in the drafting of
testaments.”65 The Louisiana Supreme Court even noted that “our
56. Id. at 295.
57. Id.
58. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.140, at 248–249.
59. Korns, supra note 50, at 295. The one limitation observed for the statutory
will was that it could not be used by one who could not read. LA. REV. STAT. §
9:2443 (repealed); Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 11.
60. Korns, supra note 50, at 296–297; see also Loretta Garvey Whyte,
Donations—Imperfect Compliance with the Formal Requirements of the Statutory
Will, 15 LOY. L. REV. 362, 365 (1969); Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 10 (noting
that “the formalities to be observed are not onerous and seem to give adequate
protection against attack on the ground of fraud or forgery”).
61. Korns, supra note 50, at 296; see also Whyte, supra note 60, at 363.
62. Korns, supra note 50, at 296.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 297; see also Whyte, supra note 60, at 364.
65. Oppenheim, supra note 32, at 10.
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legislature authorized the statutory will, adopting it from the common law,
as a means of evading the rigid standards of form required of civil law
testaments.”66 Some have suggested that “[i]t was the intention of the
legislature to provide a will form which was not complicated by rigid
formalities, which would be suitable even for long and intricate
testaments, and which would be executed without fear that it would be
declared null in probate proceedings.”67 Others have noted that “there is
no doubt that the purpose of the 1952 legislation was to adopt a form of a
will free of many technicalities connected with the making” of previous
types of wills.68 If such was the case, then it worked quite well, as
“relatively little litigation” was reported until the late 1960s.69 One author
noted that “[i]t appears that the courts have been aware of the purpose of
the statute as they have, from the beginning, construed its provisions
liberally.”70 A liberal approach to will construction was a notable change
from the past when courts strictly assessed compliance with the formal
requirements for wills authorized by the Louisiana Civil Code. In applying
the will formalities for the traditional civil law wills, scholars have
observed that “courts require[d] absolute compliance with the codal
provisions to form in the execution of a will as a prerequisite to formal
validity” and that “[f]ailure to comply exactly with the required formalities
. . . [served to nullify] the testament.”71
Although a multitude of will forms previously existed in Louisiana,
today there are only two forms of wills: olographic and notarial.72 The
olographic will must still be written, dated, and signed in the handwriting
of the testator.73 The notarial will is essentially the old “statutory will” with
its governing law relocated from the Louisiana Revised Statutes to the
Civil Code and renamed to reflect its new placement.74 Just as with the old
statutory will, the notarial will involves the use of a notary and two
witnesses, in addition to a number of other specific requirements.75
66. Succession of Porche, 288 So. 2d 27, 30 (La. 1973).
67. See Whyte, supra note 60, at 365.
68. Carlos E. Lazarus, Successions and Donations, 24 LA. L. REV. 184, 186
n.7 (1964).
69. Whyte, supra note 60, at 362. During the late 1960s, however, a
“relatively sudden upsurge of controversy” occurred. Id.
70. Id. at 366.
71. John Minor Wisdom & Paul O.H. Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in
Louisiana Estate Planning, 26 TUL. L. REV. 119, 121 (1952).
72. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 1574.
73. Id. art. 1575.
74. Id. art. 1577.
75. Id.
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Although some civil law jurisdictions maintain “public wills”
executed by a notary and two witnesses, these are not the notarial wills of
Louisiana. The French or Belgian public will requires that the testator
dictate his will to the notary in the presence of the witnesses, which is then
read by the testator and signed by the testator, witnesses, and notary.76 The
laws in various Latin American countries provide similarly,77 as does
Italian law, under which a will can be received by a notary and two
witnesses or by two notaries.78 The public wills of the civil law are more
reminiscent of the nuncupative will by public act, whereby Louisiana
citizens could dictate their wills to a notary public in the presence of a
varying number of witnesses. Louisiana’s notarial will, on the other hand,
is based upon the common law attested will with some civilian ornaments.
Spanish law allows for notarial wills, but the requirement of witnesses has
been discarded in most instances.79 Indeed, even the Uniform Probate
Code today allows for a will executed before a notary, but in place of,
rather than in addition to, the two witnesses.80
II. COMPLIANCE WITH FORMALITIES
In light of the numerous requirements for the execution of a will in
Louisiana—both historically and presently—the jurisprudence is replete
with examples of defective compliance. The problem of defective
compliance with the will formalities is not, however, a problem isolated,
or even particularized, to Louisiana. In fact, the courts in all states have
faced this issue and have slowly and somewhat inconsistently moved away
from requiring “strict” compliance with will formalities to a more
permissive “substantial” compliance doctrine. Unfortunately, even courts
that have adopted a substantial compliance doctrine have, in many
instances, proceeded excessively cautiously. Nevertheless, legislatures in
some other states have raced ahead to adopt a permissive “harmless error”
approach, which allows courts to probate many wills that clearly do not

76. Pintens, supra note 44, at 62–63. French law also allows for wills
executed before two notaries without any further requirement for witnesses. See,
e.g., C. CIV. art. 971 (Fr.).
77. Jan Peter Schmidt, Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with
Particular Reference to Brazil, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44,
at 101.
78. Braun, supra note 44, at 131.
79. Sergio Cámara Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 79.
80. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (2008).
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comply with the requisite formalities. The patchwork landscape in the
United States provides a fruitful ground for comparative assessment.
A. The Slow Migration from “Strict Compliance” to “Substantial
Compliance” to “Harmless Error” in the United States
Historically, courts have very strictly assessed the validity of wills and
their compliance with the prescribed formalities. As one scholar has noted,
“[u]nder traditional law, for a will to be admitted to probate it must be in
strict compliance with the formal requirements of the applicable Wills
Act.”81 For instance, in In re Groffman, an English court refused to probate
a will that failed to strictly comply with the Wills Act because the testator
did not acknowledge his signature on the will to both witnesses at the same
time, as required by the English Wills Act of 1837.82 In Groffman, one
night, after coffee and cakes, the testator summoned his companions to
witness his will. Unfortunately, one of his companions was “somewhat
cumbrous in his movements and was left behind.”83 Because the testator
then proceeded to acknowledge his signature to the two witnesses at
different times, the court denied probate. After noting that it was “satisfied
that the document does represent the testamentary intentions of the
deceased,” the court declared that it was “bound to pronounce against th[e]
will” for noncompliance with the required formalities.84
Two rationales, both of which make appearances in Louisiana judicial
decisions, support the above strict compliance approach. The first is the
floodgates argument. Form requirements exist for a reason—primarily to
prevent fraud, mistake, undue influence, and uncertainty.85 To relax the
form requirements is to increase the risk for fraud: “The only safe rule is
to confine [wills to those that comply with the prescribed formalities]: if
we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go
fifty.”86
The second explanation for strict compliance is one based upon
separation of powers and authority. The legislature writes the law, and the
courts interpret it. When the legislature has made its will clear, the court
cannot ignore the positive law in the pretense of pursuing its spirit or for
the purposes of pursing individual justice. If the required prerequisites for
81. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 146.
82. Id. at 147–47 (discussing In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 (PC)).
83. Id. (quoting In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 (PC)).
84. Id.
85. In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. 2012).
86. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Meeson & Welsby 109, 115 (1842) (denying
recovery to an injured party based upon lack of privity of contract).
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the execution of a testament fail to achieve justice, it is the job and
responsibility of the legislature, not the court as a super-legislature, to
correct the law. Even as recently as 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court
seemed to adopt the above argument and noted that “courts have
consistently interpreted statutes prescribing the formalities for execution
of an attested will as mandatory and have required strict compliance with
these statutory mandates.”87 It continued by concluding, “we have no
authority to dispense with the statute mandating” the prescribed will
formalities.88
Although both of the above arguments have some force, the dire
consequences predicted by the first have not come to pass. Courts in a
variety of jurisdictions around the world have loosened form requirements
without appreciable increase in the risk of fraud or uncertainty. Moreover,
although the reluctance of many courts to rewrite the law is admirable, it
is hard to ascribe deliberative legislative intent to some seemingly
insignificant and minor technical form requirements. In partial recognition
of this fact, many courts in modern times have adopted standards of
“substantial compliance” rather than absolute strict compliance.
Certainly, no one argument for “substantial compliance” has been
more influential in the wills context than that of John Langbein.89 As far
back as 1975, he advocated for enforcement of noncomplying wills,
provided that the will demonstrates “testamentary intent” and fulfills the
purposes of the Wills Act.90 Importantly, Langbein’s argument was not
one for forgiving only slight mistakes or technical violations of the form
requirements. Rather, he advocated for overlooking noncompliance in
general when the violation did not contravene the purpose of the relevant
wills law:
Attestation by two witnesses where the state calls for three, or by
or where it asks for two, is a less serious defect, because the
execution of the will was witnessed and the omission goes to the
quantity rather than the quality of the evidence. Other evidence of
finality of intention and deliberate execution might then suffice to
show that the missing witness was harmless to the statutory
purpose.91

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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As popular as the phrase “substantial compliance” has become,
however, “the substantial compliance doctrine evolved into something
narrower than Langbein had intended.”92 Many courts held that a
document could not be in substantial compliance if the deviation from the
form requirements was anything other than “minimal.”93 For instance, in
Smith v. Smith, a Kentucky court—at clear odds with the doctrine of
substantial compliance as advocated by Langbein—concluded that
substantial compliance was “inapplicable” to a will signed by only one
witness when two were required.94 As a result of a plethora of cases like
Smith and after a detailed review of cases in Queensland that employed
the “substantial compliance” doctrine, Langbein acknowledged that the
experiment with the doctrine was a “flop.”95
The Louisiana experience with “substantial compliance” is no
different. Although Succession of Guezuraga is often credited as the
genesis of the “substantial compliance” doctrine in Louisiana,96 its origins
date much further back. At least as early as 1838, the Louisiana Supreme
Court indicated a desire to flexibly apply many of the rigid form
requirements for wills and to enforce wills that may not strictly comply,
provided substantial compliance with the form requirements exists. For
example, in Segur’s Heirs v. Segur, et al., the Louisiana Supreme Court
evaluated a nuncupative will by public act that the notary had written not
from direct dictation but from a memorandum that itself was written in
part from the testator’s dictation.97 Despite the requirement at the time that
the will be “written by the notary as it is dictated,” the Court upheld the
will and stated that due to “the manner in which it was written, it appears
to us there was substantially a compliance with the requisites of law.”98
92. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
180 (9th ed. 2013).
93. George Holmes, Comment, Testamentary Formalities in Louisiana;
Curing Notarial Will Defects Through a Likelihood-of-Fraud Analysis, 75 LA. L.
REV. 511, 524 (2014); Leigh A. Shipp, Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming
Wills: New Choices for Probate Courts in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723,
29–732 (2005).
94. Smith v. Smith, 348 S.W.3d 63 (Ky. App. 2011).
95. John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills:
A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1987).
96. Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987).
97. Segur’s Heirs v. Segur, et al., 12 La. 25 (La. 1838).
98. Id. (emphasis added); see also Succession of Eubanks, 9 La. Ann. 147
(La. 1854) (in similar circumstances, finding that “there was a substantial
compliance with the requirements of Article 1574 of the Code”).
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In the 20th century, the Louisiana Supreme Court repeatedly
reaffirmed its commitment to the substantial compliance doctrine in dicta
in Succession of Crouzeilles by stating that although “the observance of
the legal formalities required by law in the drawing up of wills should be
rigidly enforced[,] . . . [i]t is not our duty to refuse the carrying out of the
wishes of deceased persons by pushing the requirements of the law to
extremes.” 99 Similarly, in Stephens v. Adger, the Court announced that
“[t]he tendency of our present day jurisprudence does not exact an
absolute, strict and literal application of the wording which prescribes the
observance of specified formalities, and that such exactitude should not be
pushed to extremes unless it be in those instances in which the law is
palpably violated.”100 The Court observed that it was “in full accord and
ha[s] so announced, that a substantial compliance with the formalities
required in the execution of wills is sufficient to sustain its validity, more
especially where there is no suggestion or intimation of fraud, deception,
undue influence, or mental incapacity.”101
Even though the early cases on “substantial compliance” concerned
nuncupative wills, the courts were aware that the purpose of the statutory
will, enacted in the 1950s, was to provide testators with flexibility, and
hence they “construed its provisions liberally.”102 In Succession of Porche,
for example, Justice Tate, writing for the Court, upheld a will that was
signed by the testator at the end of the dispositive provisions but not after
the attestation clause.103 The Court concluded that the will “substantially
complies with the statutory formalities and is therefore valid.”104
The rationale of the Court in Porche was picked up over a decade later
in Succession of Guezuraga, where the Court even further amplified its
reasoning.105 In Guezuraga, the Court evaluated a will in which the
testatrix failed to sign on the page that contained only the conclusion of
the attestation clause.106 In upholding the will, the Court noted that
although the legislation required that a will be signed at the “end,” the
Court was not required “to give the statutory will a strict interpretation.”107
The Court reasoned:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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Succession of Porche, 288 So. 2d 27 (La. 1973).
Id. at 29.
Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987).
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Where the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with
fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should
not produce nullity. It was the intent of the legislature to reduce
form to the minimum necessary to prevent fraud. It is submitted
that in keeping with this intent, slight departures from form should
be viewed in light of their probable cause. If they indicate an
increased likelihood that fraud may have been perpetrated they
would be considered substantial and thus a cause to nullify the
will. If not, they should be disregarded.108
Several decades later, the Court revisited substantial compliance in In
re Succession of Holbrook. Justice Guidry, writing for a unanimous Court,
appropriately concluded that a notarial will, which contained the date
within the body of the will, was still valid, even though the attestation
clause did not separately contain a date.109 While noting that the model
attestation clause provided in the Louisiana Civil Code contains blanks
and language indicating that a date is required, the Court reiterated its
longstanding holding that “courts need not strictly adhere to the statutory
will, to the extent of elevating form over function.”110
Up to this point, one might have reasonably concluded that Louisiana
had adopted an expansive version of “substantial compliance” along the
lines of which Langbein had advocated. In 2017, however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Successions of Toney indicated that such was not the
case. The Toney case involved a three-page will in which the first two
pages were initialed rather than signed and in which the attestation clause
on the third page contained a number of formal defects.111 Although the
technical deviations were certainly numerous, the trial court made it a
point to observe that there did not seem to be any indication of fraud.
Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the deviations not to be
“slight departures” or “minor deviations,” but rather “significant and
material” ones.112 Consequently, the will was invalid. The Toney case
provoked two persuasive dissents by Chief Justice Johnson and Justice
108. Id.
109. In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).
110. Id. at 851.
111. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397 (La. 2017) (specifically, the
attestation clause did not state that the will was signed on each page, did not state
that the notary viewed the will being signed, did not state that the testator declared
to the notary that the instrument was the testator’s last will—although the
witnesses so stated—and did not state that the witnesses signed in the presence of
the notary).
112. Id.
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Weimer, both of whom argued for upholding the will based upon a
consideration of the substantial compliance doctrine in light of the lack of
evidence suggesting the existence of fraud.113
As the latest expression of the substantial compliance doctrine from
the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Toney case is significant, albeit
lamentable. It repudiates the broader language in earlier cases that focused
upon the risk of fraud and the purposes of the formalities, substituting in
its place a narrower doctrine that upholds wills only when deviations from
the form requirements are minor or insignificant. The Court concluded that
any “material” deviation from the form requirements renders a will null,
“even in the absence of any indication of fraud. Any language in previous
jurisprudence which suggested otherwise is rejected.”114 Indeed, even an
accumulation of insignificant deviations appears to amass to a material and
significant one that would be enough to invalidate a will.
As expected, the progeny following Toney has taken a narrow view of
substantial compliance. In Succession of Anderson, the Louisiana Second
Circuit invalidated a will in which “color copies of the testator’s signature
somehow appeared on the first two pages of the testament.”115 Citing
Toney, the court noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “the
testator’s initialing each page did not substantially comply with the formal
requirements of the code article and was not merely a minor or a technical
deviation.”116 The same court in Succession of Rogers invalidated two
wills because “[n]owhere on the final page of the wills is it indicated that
the notary and witnesses signed in the presence of the testator/testatrix and
each other.”117 Relying upon Toney, the court noted that even though
“there does not appear to be any indication of fraud, we find the deviation
from the required testamentary form . . . [to be] significant and
material.”118
Similarly, in Succession of Johnson, the First Circuit declared null a
will because the attestation clause did “not contain a declaration that it was
signed by the testator in the presence of the notary, or that the testator
declared it to be his last will and testament in the presence of the notary.”119
Rather, the declaration merely stated that he “acknowledged to me [the
notary] that he . . . executed the instrument.”120 Furthermore, in Succession
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Succession of Anderson, 264 So. 3d 684, 692 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019).
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Succession of Rogers, 243 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1214.
Succession of Johnson, 2017 WL 658775 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
Id.

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1350

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

of Ivey, the Third Circuit invalidated a will when the attestation clause
failed to contain a statement that “the witnesses and notary declare in the
presences of the testator and each other that they signed their names on a
specified date.”121 The court noted that “Mr. Ivey’s will does not
substantially comply with the requirements of a notarial will” and is
therefore “invalid and null.”122 Despite a claim that there was no allegation
of fraud, the court noted that “[t]he supreme court rejected this argument
in Toney . . . , holding that the failure of an attestation clause to
substantially comply with the requirements . . . renders it absolutely null,
‘even in the absence of fraud.’”123
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a four-page will that had
been “signed . . . at the end of the testament and only initialed [on] the
other three pages.”124 The court, relying on Toney, concluded that
deviation from the form requirements was “material and significant.”125
Although the court noted that Toney involved multiple deviations and the
present case involved only one, the court concluded that “[t]here is no
indication that the result would have been different if only one deviation
was present.”126
Of course, there is no way to tell, ex ante, which form deviations are
“significant and material” and which are not. Additionally, it is worth
remembering that the point of substantial compliance is not to distinguish
between excusable slight errors and inexcusable large ones. All formalities
should be considered in light of the purposes they serve. In Succession of
Pickett, from the 1960s, the First Circuit upheld a will even though the
attestation clause did not contain an “express declaration on the part of the
testator to the notary and the witnesses that the instrument was the
testator’s last will and testament.”127 This result, of course, is directly
contrary to the recent case of Succession of Johnson, mentioned above. In
explaining its rationale, the Pickett court observed that:
We believe . . . that the attestation clause set out in [statute] is
permissive, and that the attestation clause in the instant case . . .
constitutes substantial compliance with the formalities required by
the statute in the execution of a will under its terms. The body of
121. Succession of Ivey, 238 So. 3d 532, 537 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Succession of Carter, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 2764372, at *1 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2020).
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Succession of Pickett, 189 So. 2d 670, 673 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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the will in this case . . . contains a recitation by the testatrix that
she signed the last will in the presence of the witnesses. There is
not present in this case any suggestion or intimation of fraud,
deception, undue influence, or mental incapacity.128
In particular, the flexibility with which courts historically treated form
requirements for statutory—now notarial—wills seems to have been
forgotten. In Succession of Saarela, the testator’s will began with a
declaration that it was his last will and testament and ended with an
attestation clause that stated he had “signed this my last will and testament
in the presence of the witnesses and notary.”129 In what would regrettably
be an almost unthinkable result today, the court upheld the will, finding it
“substantially similar to the form given as an example in the statute.”130
Unfortunately, the wisdom of the courts in Pickett and Saarela seems
overlooked in many modern instances. Some commentators have rightly
“characterized Louisiana’s version of ‘substantial compliance’ as
‘substantially strict compliance.’”131 They contend that courts should
probate a will “unless there is a likelihood of fraud or undue influence.”132
Due in large part to the “unfulfilled promise” of the substantial
compliance doctrine, John Langbein largely abandoned the doctrine in
favor of a different approach. Writing in 1987, Langbein advocated for an
approach known as “harmless error,” which would permit the probate of a
defectively executed will, provided the proponents could establish that the
“will expresses the decedent’s testamentary intent.”133 The rationale for
the “harmless error” approach was to allow for the distribution of “estates
of those who have committed innocuous execution errors” without at the
same time “engendering trumped-up claims.”134 After studying the
experience of South Australian courts with this doctrine, Langbein argued
that “the rule works” and that “litigation levels have been astonishingly
low.”135 In 1990, the Uniform Probate Code adopted a “harmless error”
rule for wills. Specifically, under the Uniform Probate Code, a document
that is not in compliance with the prescribed formalities “is treated as if it
had been executed in compliance . . . if the proponent of the document or
writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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intended the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”136
The Restatement is also “aligned with this modern trend” and “adopts the
position that a harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the
proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
adopted the document as his or her will.”137 At present, 11 states have
adopted some version of the “harmless error” rule for will formalities.138
B. Compliance in Other Jurisdictions, Civil and Common
The United States is not the only jurisdiction to wrestle with the
tension between imposing strict compliance and allowing substantial
compliance with will formalities. As previously mentioned, the move
toward substantial compliance originated not in this country but from
comparative research based upon the experience of courts in various
Australian states. In fact, many jurisdictions— both civil and common—
have experienced a “flight from formalism,” but courts have implemented
it in differing ways.
In Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, a document can be
probated as a will, even if it does not comply with the prescribed
formalities, if it can be shown that the testator intended it to be his will.139
As Nicola Peart has written, “[i]n both Australia and New Zealand the
court has the power to admit documents to probate that do not satisfy the
formal requirements for execution of a will. South Australia initiated this
change in 1975 to save wills from technical failure to reduce the number
of unintended intestacies.”140 In fact, the South Australian experience
served as the basis for John Langbein’s research and the foundation for his
proposal on “harmless error,” which is now in place in a number of U.S.
136. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503.
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
138. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 176. For further discussion of
the evolution of will formalities, see Crawford, supra note 3, at 280–85. For a
recent discussion of the cases that apply the harmless error rule in both the United
States and abroad, see Susan N. Gary, When Is an Execution Error Harmless?:
Electronic Wills Raise New Harmless Error Issues, 33 PROB. & PROP. 41 (2019).
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota enacted, effective March 13,
2020, a temporary “harmless error” rule for wills executed between March 13,
2020, and February 15, 2021. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-503.
139. Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J de Waal, & Reinhard Zimmermann,
Testamentary Formalities in Historical and Comparative Perspectives, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 465.
140. Nicola Peart, Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 349.
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states. Other Australian states, such as Queensland and New South Wales,
followed suit in 1981 and 1989.141 Tasmania is the outlier, insofar as it
adopted the dispensing power only in 2008, and it requires a higher burden
of proof, namely the proponent of the will must demonstrate that there is
“no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to
constitute his will.”142 Although some states have been conservative with
the dispensing power, South Australian courts have used it to probate even
“unsigned” documents, provided it can be shown that the testator intended
the document to serve as his will and that the omission was accidental.143
South Africa—a mixed jurisdiction like Louisiana—also statutorily
provides that courts may probate noncompliant documents as wills. In
South Africa, this power is referred to as the “condonation power” because
courts can “condone formally defective wills under certain
circumstances.”144 Specifically, “[i]f a court is satisfied that a document
. . . was intended to be [the testator’s] will . . . , the court shall order the
Master to accept that document . . . as a will, although it does not comply
with all the formalities for the execution . . . of wills.” 145 Israel, another
mixed jurisdiction, also maintains a version of the dispensing power, under
which courts may order probate of a document, notwithstanding defects in
form, provided the fundamental parts of the will are present.146 Québec
includes a type of dispensing power in its civil code and provides that “[a]
holograph will or a will made in the presence of witnesses that does not
meet all the requirements of that form is valid nevertheless if it meets the
essential requirements thereof and if it unquestionably and unequivocally
contains the last wishes of the deceased.”147
Even some more traditional civil law jurisdictions have taken a
flexible approach to will formalities. Some jurisdictions have made a
distinction between important or “core” formalities and less important or

141. Id. at 350.
142. Id.; TASMANIAN WILLS ACT § 10(1) (2008).
143. Peart, Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 350.
144. Marius J de Waal, Testamentary Formalities in South Africa, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 396.
145. Id.; TASMANIAN WILLS ACT § 2(3) (2008).
146. See, e.g., Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless Error in Will Execution: The
Israeli Experience, ESTATE PLANNING & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. (2011); Celia
Wasserstein Fassberg, Form and Formalism: A Case Study, 31 AM. J. COMP. L.
627, 643–51 (1983).
147. QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE art. 714.
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“ancillary” ones. In Polish law148 and under certain international wills,
noncompliance with formalities results in invalidity only if the defect
relates to a “core” formality, such as: (1) that the will be in writing; (2) that
the will be signed by the testator, witnesses, and notary; and (3) that the
will be declared by the testator as his will.149
Other civil law jurisdictions have saved noncompliant wills by holding
that they are merely voidable or relatively null, as opposed to void or
absolutely null. For example, in Spain, Italy, Hungary, and the
Netherlands, a noncompliant document may be considered as voidable,
rather than void, meaning that it might still be given effect if no relevant
party objects.150 Under Spanish law, a formally defective will is “void” in
principle, but commentators have noted that wills are occasionally rescued
by the distinction between absolute and relative nullity.151
Although under Dutch law, as under Louisiana law, failure to meet the
formal requirements for a will traditionally rendered the transaction void
or absolutely null,152 since 2003 Dutch law has become more lenient in
recognizing that many of the formalities associated with wills are designed
to protect private parties rather than being intrinsic to public order or the
nature of the act.153 Consequently, “only failure of the notary or the testator
148. Fryderyk Zoll, Testamentary Formalities in the Poland, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 277 (documenting the academic
debate for the argument that noncompliance by a notary with the rules prescribed
for wills may not in all cases result in invalidity of a will).
149. Reid, et al., Historical and Comparative, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 466.
150. Id.
151. Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 91.
152. Wilbert D. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 170.
153. Id. For critique of Louisiana’s law on nullity, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr.,
Rethinking the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 663 (2014). As an interesting
note of comparison, a recent Louisiana case seems to have adopted this approach
in substance, if not in form. In Succession of Barbee, the court of appeal for the
Fourth Circuit reversed a trial court’s decision when the trial court, sua sponte,
denied probate to a will based upon the court’s observation that the signatures on
the decedent’s will varied to such an extent that the court believed they were not
authentic. 286 So. 3d 461 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019). The court of appeal
concluded that the trial court “lacked standing to challenge the validity or veracity
of decedent’s signature when there was no such challenge raised by any party.”
Id. at 466. Although the court did not explicitly employ the distinction between
absolute and relative nullities, its decision clearly invokes the substance of that
dichotomy insofar as relative nullities can be raised only by the party in whose
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to sign the will has resulted in voidness; any other formal defects result
only in voidability.”154 In fact, even before the change in the law in the
Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court “showed it was not in favour of
excessive adherence to formalities” in holding that a will that mentioned
the month and day but not the year was not void for formal defects but
only voidable.155 Because the year could be established in other ways, the
will was upheld.156
Italian law provides similar results.157 Under the Italian Civil Code of
1865, all formal defects resulted in a transaction being void.158 Today,
however, under article 606 of the current Italian Civil Code, the answer is
more complex.159 An olographic will without a signature or not in the
handwriting of the testator is void.160 Likewise, a notarial will is void if it
is not reduced “to writing” from the testator’s declaration or if “the testator
is incapable of signing . . . [and] there is no declaration indicating the
reason.”161 In all other cases of formal defects, however, the will is merely
voidable and can only be set aside if challenged within five years.162
Similarly, Hungarian law employs the concept of voidability (relative
nullity) rather than the concept of voidness (absolutely nullity) for formal
defects in wills.163 Of course, “[t]he idea is that defects should not be
penalized unless they affect another person who objects to the defective

interest the nullity is established, whereas absolute nullities can be invoked by
anyone, even the court on its own initiative. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030,
with art. 2031. In light of article 1573 declaring that “[t]he formalities prescribed
for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely
null,” the court’s conclusion is certainly suspect. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1573. Given
the legislative dictate of article 1573, it seems the preferable way to resolve the
Barbee case would have been to reverse the trial court by concluding that there
was insufficient factual evidence to sustain the trial court’s decision.
154. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 170.
155. Id. at 171.
156. Id.
157. Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 138.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Lajos Vékás, Testamentary Formalities in Hungary, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 267.
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will . . . mean[ing] that neither a notary public nor a court can take into
account ex officio a formal mistake in the drawing up of a will.”164
Despite the variety of approaches, one thing is clear: Formalism is
waning in favor of promoting testamentary intent. Whether it is through
substantial compliance, harmless error, the dispensing or condonation
power, the distinction between core and peripheral formalities, or the
differences between relative and absolute nullities, both civil and common
law jurisdictions alike show a disdain for invalidating wills with some
level of formal defect. Although not all doctrines are equally permissive,
the trend is clear. Even though Louisiana, in some sense, is in the
prevailing trend, it has much work to be done, as the recent trend in
Louisiana jurisprudence seems to be to invalidate wills that fail to strictly
comply with the will formalities.
III. THE LAW OF TODAY: COMMON FEATURES OF NOTARIAL AND
OLOGRAPHIC WILLS IN LOUISIANA
With the above background in mind, this Part considers in detail each
of the formalities prescribed for the making of wills under Louisiana law.
Of the two types of wills recognized in Louisiana—olographic and
notarial—some common characteristics exist. That is, one can speak of
basic or core requirements for either type of will in Louisiana before
proceeding to the specific or additional requirements for a particular type
of will. Namely, three common formalities exist for all wills in Louisiana:
(1) that they be in writing; (2) that they be signed; and (3) that they be
dated.
A. Writing
At first glance, the requirement that a will must be in writing seems
obvious. Oral wills are not legally enforceable. Ordinarily, the formality
of writing—without more—is imposed for proof purposes and satisfies the
evidentiary function. A writing is more reliable than witness testimony.
No classic swearing contests can be allowed when the matter involves the
disposition of one’s estate after death; the requirement of a writing
forestalls any such disputes. But suppose one could establish the contents
of a decedent’s last wishes without any dispute and by unequivocal and
unrebutted testimony. With reliability beyond doubt as to the decedent’s
desires, what reason exists not to enforce the undisputed desires of the
decedent?
164. Id. at 267.
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Unlike testimonial proof, a writing is more permanent. Its proof exists
as long as the writing itself exists, and it outlives the memory of both
witnesses and the parties themselves. For these reasons, land
transactions—that is, the transfer of immovable property—must, at a
minimum, be in writing.165 Such transactions are far too important and
durable to leave up to the recollection of mere mortals.
Some jurisdictions, in extreme cases, allow oral wills. Prior to 1999,
Louisiana law contained special rules for testaments made by military
personnel in the field, by sick or wounded military personnel, and by
sailors at sea.166 Although these “special” wills could be “received” by
officers, physicians, or the master of the vessel, they thereafter had to be
“reduced to writing” and signed by the testator “if he could write” and by
the person who received it and any witnesses. In other words, the testator
would “dictate” his will to the relevant recipient who would then write it
down, and the relevant parties would sign the document. All such
“irregular” wills, however, were of limited duration—six months after the
return of the testator for military wills and three months from return for
wills made at sea.167 These wills were always considered “extraordinary,”
and deviations from the regular form were tolerated only because of the
lack of ability to make a regular will and only for such time as the testator
could be expected to make a regular will after his return.
Writing in the 1920s, Judge Saunders stated that “[t]hese instruments
have no practical value whatever . . . and that [he could not] recall . . . that
one of these irregular wills has ever been presented to probate in the courts
of Louisiana.”168 Indeed, the present author could not find a single reported
case in which any of the above “extraordinary” wills was ever discussed
or even mentioned. In any event, Louisiana no longer has such rules. All
wills must be in writing.
Despite the clarity of the “writing” rule, its content still remains
murky. After all, what constitutes a writing? As obvious as this issue may
seem, it has been, and is again, subject to debate. Under the prior law,
which allowed for nuncupative wills by public act to be dictated to and
“written” by a notary, the question arose as to whether a will “typewritten”
by the notary qualified as “written.” In Prudhomme v. Savant, over a
strenuous dissent, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that a
typewritten document constitutes a writing.169 Consequently, in 1952,
165.
166.
167.
168.
(1925).
169.
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Id. arts. 1600, 1604.
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when the legislature first allowed for statutory wills, the law provided that
“a will shall be valid if in writing (whether typewritten, printed,
mimeographed, or written in any other manner).”170 Aside from the
obvious semantic problem of defining a “writing” as something “written
in any other manner,” scholars have suggested that the parenthetical was
wisely included in the legislation to remove “any doubt regarding the
meaning of the word ‘written.’”171
The law is the same today. Comment (d) to article 1577 provides that
for notarial wills, “the form of the writing (typewritten, mimeographed or
any other form) is immaterial.”172 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
writing as “[a]ny intentional recording of words in a visual form, whether
in handwriting, printing, typewriting, or any other tangible form that may
be viewed or heard with or without mechanical aids.”173
Although wills in Louisiana are most often written in English, “there
is no requirement that the testament be in the English language, or even in
Roman characters.”174 Older examples in Louisiana jurisprudence provide
examples of enforceable wills written in French.175 Indeed, wills could
presumably be written in any language, even in code or a made-up
language, such as Esperanto or even Klingon.176 As the comments to the
Louisiana Civil Code indicate, “[s]o long as it is written in a language that
the testator can read and understand, the protections to assure verity of the
provisions are satisfied.”177
Despite the clarity of the current “writing” requirement, an oral will
could still have some effect today. An often forgotten provision in the
Louisiana Civil Code provides that a natural obligation exists “[w]hen the
universal successors are not bound by a civil obligation to execute the
donations and other dispositions made by a deceased person that are null
for want of form.”178 Thus, oral testaments—and indeed any testament null
for want of form—impose a natural obligation upon the testator’s
universal successors to execute the donations mortis causa that the
170. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442 (repealed).
171. Louisiana Legislation, supra note 49, at 32.
172. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 cmt. (d).
173. Writing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
174. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 cmt. (d). This is a notable improvement over the
Roman requirement that “the whole will must be in Latin.” BARRY NICHOLAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 258 (1962).
175. See, e.g., Lagrave v. Merle, 5 La. Ann. 278 (La. 1850).
176. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 251
(1937).
177. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 cmt. (d).
178. Id. art. 1762(3).
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decedent intended. It is consequently worth noting that although a
disappointed legatee could not successfully sue for enforcement of such a
donation, any performance by the decedent’s universal successors could
not be reclaimed, and promises by them to the legatees to discharge the
legacies could be enforceable as onerous contracts without need of
complying with the form requirements for donations.179 The same is true
today in France.180 So too in Italy, where article 590 of the Italian Civil
Code “prevents a challenge to a will by a person who, having been
informed as to the cause of invalidity, nonetheless confirms the disposition
or voluntarily executes it after the testator’s death.”181
Natural obligations aside, written wills come in a variety of styles, and
examples of unconventional writings that courts have accepted include
wills written on a corncrib, scratched into a bedpost, written on an empty
eggshell, or etched into a fender of a tractor.182 As there is no requirement
in Louisiana law that a will be written on paper—certainly the most
common medium—all of the above wills should be acceptable in
Louisiana, provided the other formalities are met. Although not explicitly
stated, it certainly seems reasonable that the writing must take place in a
medium of some level of permanence.183 Waving a finger in the air would
likely be an insufficient “writing,”184 as would a writing in sand or
“scratched on a cake of ice.”185 There seems no reason, however, that a
will could not be tattooed onto a person, as some novelists have
suggested.186 The specifications provided by Atkinson in the 1940s seem
equally apt today: “Ordinary wills must be in writing but may be in any
language and inscribed with any material or device on any substance
which results in a readable and fairly permanent record.”187
Although it is clear today that the term “writing” is broad and includes
handwritten, typewritten, and similar types of permanent recordation of
words, the advent of new technology has created both new opportunities
179. Id. arts. 1760–61.
180. MICHEL GRIMALDI, DROIT CIVIL: LIBÉRALITÉS PARTAGE
D’ASCENDANTS 259–60 (2000).
181. Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 139.
182. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 250; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note
4, at 202.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
184. Id.
185. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 249.
186. Id. at 250; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 164.
187. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 249.
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and new questions. For example, in In re Estate of Julian Castro, an Ohio
court found that a testator validly executed a will from a hospital bed when
the testator dictated his will to a friend who transcribed it onto a Samsung
Galaxy tablet. The testator then signed the electronic document with a
stylus. The court found that the writing requirement for a will was
satisfied, even though the will was written only on an electronic medium
and not on physical paper.188 Under Louisiana law, this method should also
be acceptable as a writing, provided the testator complies with the other
necessary formalities.189
Although a will written on an electronic tablet seems to plausibly
constitute a writing, some jurisdictions go even further and allow for the
probate of computer files and video recordings as wills. South African
courts have accepted electronic documents as wills, including emails and
an
unprinted
computer
file
labeled
as
follows:
190
“C:WINDOWS/MYSTUFF/MYWILL/PERSONAL.”
Documents or
writings in Australia include “not only standard paper wills, but also
computer files and discs, microfiches, photographs, text messages on
mobile phones, emails, as well as video and audio tapes.”191 New Zealand
law is similarly expansive, but it excludes “video and audio-taped
wills.”192 Even in the United States, courts have had to consider whether a
will recorded on video is a “writing” under the wills statute. Namely, in In
re Estate of Reed, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the
holographic will statute allowed the probate of a tape recording that the
testator sealed in an envelope upon which the testator had written, “Robert
Reed To be played in the event of my death only! (signed) Robert G.
Reed.”193 First, the court disregarded the envelope, noting that “[t]his
writing standing alone has no testamentary consequence, and cannot be
considered a will.”194 Although voice recordings may demonstrate many
of the same identifying functions as a writing, the court noted that:
188. In re Estate of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES11140 (Lorain Cnty. Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. June 19, 2013).
189. For discussion of this issue under German law, see Cyril H. Hergenröder,
Testieren 2.0: Errichtung eines digitalen eigenhändigen Testaments mittels Touchoder Smartpen?, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ERBRECHT UND VERMÖGENSNACHFOLGE 7
(2018).
190. de Waal, Testamentary Formalities in South Africa, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 396–97.
191. Peart, Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand, in
Testamentary Formalities in Austria, supra note 44, at 351.
192. Id. at 351.
193. In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983).
194. Id.
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The use of a tape recording or other type of voice print as a
testamentary instrument is a decision for the legislature to make.
We will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend the holographic will
statute to include a testamentary device not falling within the
express provisions of the statute.195
The court reached this conclusion, even though the Wyoming law of
evidence defines a “writing” or “recording” as “letters, words, sounds or
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or
electronic recording, or other form of data compilation.”196 This definition,
in the court’s view, was not intended to change the meaning of similar
terms in the law of wills.
In Austria, it is “not possible to establish a will in electronic form.”197
It is doubtful under Louisiana law that one could stretch the meaning of
the term “writing” to include a video recording, although the requirement
of a signature would likely prove even more problematic.198 Even though
a video recording could achieve the same level of permanence as a writing
and could plausibly identify the testator’s intent for the recording to be his
will, such an expansion of the term seems outside the purview of the courts
and better addressed at the legislative level.
B. Signature
In addition to the writing requirement, all wills—olographic and
notarial—must be signed by at least the testator, although notarial wills
require additional signatures of a notary and two witnesses. Once again,
however, one must pause to consider the purpose of the testator’s signature
in addition to its parameters. In terms of purpose, this requirement seems
benign. After all, every instrument under “private signature” must be
signed,199 and the signature requirement seems reasonable because it, at a
minimum, helps “link the will with the testator” and fulfills the evidentiary
and cautionary functions.200

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Christiane C. Wendehorst, Testamentary Formalities in Austria, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 225.
198. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 250.
199. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 60.
200. MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 202
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To be sure, the testator’s signature serves at least three important
purposes. First, a signature helps to identify the testator as the author of
the document. If a will were drafted but not signed, the question would
exist as to whom the will was connected with. Second, the existence of a
signature indicates that the author not only has drafted the document but
also has adopted it and taken ownership of it. An unsigned painting, for
example, could be evidence that a painter, although the creator of the work,
is dissatisfied with the work and does not wish to be associated with it.
The signature on the will, in the words of one court, is necessary “to make
certain that [the document] constitute[s] [the decedent’s] last will.”201
Third, a signature communicates finality and indicates that the testator has
completed the document. Again, analogizing to a painting, when the
painter signs his work he indicates in some form that he is content with his
creation, and it has achieved some level of finality. The signature “serves
to distinguish the final will from a preliminary draft, an incomplete
document, or scribbled thoughts about how the will might take shape in
the future.”202
Louisiana law has been relatively consistent on this topic. A will
without a signature has no effect. European civil law systems are generally
in accord.203 Common law sources generally agree as well. The
Restatement, which takes a permissive approach to will formalities, notes
that “[a]mong the defects in execution that can be excused, the lack of a
signature is the hardest to excuse. An unsigned will raises a serious but not
insuperable doubt about whether the testator adopted the document as his
or her will.”204 Although some courts in extreme cases have probated
unsigned wills,205 Louisiana courts generally have not. This is true even if
the testator has sealed his unsigned will inside of an envelope and
thereafter signed the envelope. Such an action has been held “not [to]
constitute a sufficient signature to the will.”206 Only in a very idiosyncratic
case has a Louisiana court allowed the probate of a document as a will if
the document does not contain a signature. For example, in Hamilton v.
Kelley, the siblings of a testator removed the signature from his olographic
will to prevent its probate in favor of one nephew and in a putative attempt

201. Succession of Fitzhugh, 127 So. 386 (La. 1930).
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
203. Fassberg, supra note 146, at 639.
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b.
205. See, e.g., In re Anton, 2015 WL 6085394 (N. J. Super. Ch. Div. 2015).
206. In re Poland’s Estate, 68 So. 415 (La. 1915).
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to preserve familial harmony.207 The court concluded that “[i]n the absence
of a showing that the signature was removed pursuant to the testator’s
request to revoke the will, the removal of the signature is ineffective in
law.”208 Consequently, the court probated the unsigned olographic will
because “the removal of a testator’s signature by a third party cannot
operate to invalidate the olographic testament.”209
1. What Is a Signature?
The mere existence of the testator’s name on a will is not necessarily
a signature. The typewritten title of a document indicating that it is “The
Last Will and Testament of John Smith” is not necessarily a signed will
merely because John Smith’s name is printed in the title. In fact, not even
“[a] person’s name written in his or her own handwriting is . . . necessarily
a signature.”210 One may include one’s name in print or in handwriting in
the exordium to a will, which may or may not constitute a signature. For
example, a will that begins, “I, John Smith, being of sound mind and body,
hereby make this my last will and testament” may or may not be signed.
If there is evidence that the testator adopted the document as his will and
viewed it as complete, then the name in the exordium should be treated as
a signature.211 Such could be the case when the testator asks witnesses to
sign the document and indicates that he adopts the document as his will.212
In other instances, such as when the document is merely found in a desk
drawer, the same writing may not be a signature. In short, “[t]o be a
signature, the testator must write his or her name with the intent of
adopting the document as his or her own.”213
Ideally, a testator would sign his full legal name at the end of the
testament with the intent of adopting the document as his will.
Unfortunately, “best practices” are often not followed, and courts are
frequently left to interpret the testator’s name written in some abbreviated
form in a place other than at the bottom of the testament. Undoubtedly,
“John Smith” could be a sufficient signature, even if the testator’s full legal
name is “John Robert Smith III.” In fact, “Jack Smith” or “J. Smith” could
also be sufficient and meet the above requirements of a signature. Without
207.
208.
209.
210.

Hamilton v. Kelley, 641 So. 2d 981 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
211. Id. § 3.1 cmt. k.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 3.1 cmt. j.
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exactly equating a “signature” and a “mark,” the Louisiana Civil Code
allows a testator to “affix his mark . . . where his signature would otherwise
be required” in instances where a testator cannot sign his name, indicating
perhaps a flexible and liberal approach to the signature requirement.214 The
Restatement provides similarly in stating that “[s]ignature by mark or
cross is sufficient . . . . So also is a signature by a term of relationship (such
as ‘Dad,’ ‘Mom,’ or ‘Auntie’), abbreviation, nickname, pet name, a first
name, a last name, initials, or pseudonym, or even by fingerprint or
seal.”215 Black’s Law Dictionary also provides that a signature is a
“person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction;
esp., one’s handwritten name as one ordinarily writes it, as at the end of a
letter or a check, to show that one has written it.”216 Atkinson similarly
observes that “[l]etters have been sustained as [signed] holographic wills
though signed with an abbreviation of the first name, or initials. Even
letters signed ‘mother,’ or with other familiar term have been held
sufficient.”217 Common law authorities have declared that “[t]he testator
may sign his name by writing it out in full or by abbreviating it, or by
writing his initials, . . . or by using an assumed name where not done with
intent to deceive.”218
Civil law systems are also in accord. Under Brazilian law, a signature
by “a pseudonym may also be sufficient if it is a name which the testator
generally uses.”219 Italian law has a similar approach:
[A] signature is valid even without the forename and surname so
long as it designates with certainty the person of the testator . . . .
Accordingly, . . . it is possible to sign the will by using, for
instance, only the surname or the first name (whether with or
without the initial of the surname) or a nickname if that is
habitually used to identify the testator or even the initials of the
first name and surname.220
Originally, French law was rigid with respect to the signature,
requiring a “proper signature” and providing that merely mentioning the
214. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1579.
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. j.
216. Signature, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
217. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 310; see also id. at 252.
218. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, §19.41, at 89; see also id. § 20.7, at 737–38.
219. Schmidt, Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with Particular
Reference to Brazil, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 103.
220. Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 129.
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“surname and first name in the text of the will does not suffice.”221 In the
modern day, however, both French and Belgian courts have taken a more
flexible approach and have allowed a mere “reference to [a] family
function, such as mother or grandmother” to be enough.222 In addition,
“French law is untroubled by first names or initials” as signatures.223 A
number of lower court decisions in Louisiana suggested similarly. For
example, in Succession of Squires, the Third Circuit upheld a will that was
signed on the last page but only initialed on the first.224 The Fourth Circuit
in Succession of Armstrong encountered the same situation and concluded
the same by stating that “initials suffice for his signature . . . . There is little
formality required for signatures which come in all shapes and sizes.” 225
In Balot y Ripoll v. Morina, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a will of
Sebastian Ripoll, who signed his will under a pseudonym, Francisco
Ballesta, which he adopted for political purposes when he moved to
Louisiana.226 The Court observed: “We are not prepared to say that the
testator’s signature of an assumed name is sufficient in itself to vitiate the
will; it is at least a sufficient descriptio personae, and perhaps more so
here, than if he had signed it under his real name.”227
Other legislation in Louisiana also adopts a broad definition of the
signature. The Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act broadly
defines an electronic signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted
by a person with the intent to sign the record.” 228 Notably, however, both
the federal Electronic Signatures Act and Louisiana’s version of the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act are inapplicable to wills.229
Interestingly, the same exclusion applies in the Netherlands, where the
scope of the legislation on electronically signed documents also excludes
wills.230
221. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 61.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see also PHILIPPE MALAURIE & CLAUDE BRENNER, DROIT DES
SUCCESSIONS ET DES LIBÉRALITÉS 297 (8th ed. 2018).
224. Succession of Squires, 640 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
225. Succession of Armstrong, 640 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1994).
226. Balot y Ripoll v. Morina, 12 Rob. 552, 558 (La. 1846).
227. Id.
228. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2602(8) (2018).
229. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 7003(a)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2603(B)(1).
230. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 166–67.
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In Successions of Toney, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court cast
doubt upon the flexibility with which courts had previously treated
signatures when it invalidated a will that was initialed rather than signed.
Although the testator’s full signature appeared on the final page of the will
and upon an affidavit attached to the will, the testator merely initialed—
rather than fully signed—the first two pages. In invalidating the will in
Toney, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Although signatures come in a variety of forms, and although a
few appellate courts have upheld wills where some pages were
initialed rather than signed, we note that La. Civ. Code art.
1557(1) unambiguously requires the testator to “sign his name at
the end of the testament and on each other separate page,” and
merely initialing undoubtedly falls short of this requirement.231
In this case, the first two pages of the will are not signed, but are
only initialed “R.T.” Further, the initials are in print rather than
cursive writing . . . . Particularly where, as here, the initials are
written in easily imitable print rather than cursive, we are hesitant
to find that this deviation from the codal requirement is merely
minor or technical. 232
The above statements should not be read broadly by subsequent courts.
There is clearly no requirement that a testator’s signature be either his full
legal name or that it be written in cursive.233 Unfortunately, the Fifth
Circuit has already given a broad reading to Toney and invalidated a will
that was signed at the end but only initialed in cursive on the other three
pages.234 According to the court, “this deviation [from the requirements of
the Civil Code] is material and significant.”235 In light of the prevailing
understanding of the meaning of the term “signature,” it is hard to imagine
how this deviation was either material or significant. It is hoped that the
Louisiana Supreme Court will soon clarify and realign Louisiana
jurisprudence with a broad and permissive interpretation of the signature
requirement that prevails in the law elsewhere. A strict interpretation of
the signature requirement is a notable deviation from the law in civil law
systems, common law courts, and other laws in Louisiana.
231. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397, 404 (La. 2017).
232. Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
233. Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 35 So. 3d 215, 225 (La. 2010).
234. Succession of Carter, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 2764372 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2020).
235. Id. at *4.
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2. Location of the Signature
Moreover, Louisiana law imposes yet another signature requirement,
namely, that the signature appear “at the end of the testament.”236 This
requirement, however, is not a deeply historical one and does not originate
in Louisiana’s civil law heritage. Under Brazilian law, for example,
“[n]ormally the signature is placed at the end of the document, but it is
also permissible to place it elsewhere, for example at the top, in the
margin, or even on the other side of the document.”237 French law contains
no rules for the location of the signature, nor did early English law. 238 The
English Statute of Frauds—and thus the law in many states—similarly
contained no requirement as to where the signature should be placed.239
Under such authority, in the leading case of Lamayne v. Stanley, an
English court upheld as validly signed a will that stated as follows: “I, John
Stanley, make this my last will.”240 Of course, a number of other states
followed the later enacted English Statute of Wills, which required that a
will be subscribed—from the Latin subscrire, meaning “to sign or write
under.”241 Some other states, including Louisiana with its original
statutory will and now its notarial will, have followed this approach. Prior
to the most recent revision, however, Louisiana law historically imposed
no such requirement regarding the location of the signature for an
olographic will. The 1870 Louisiana Civil Code merely provided that
“[t]he olographic testament is that which is written by the testator himself.
In order to be valid, it must be entirely written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator. It is subject to no other form, and may be made
anywhere, even out of the State.”242 Today, however, for all types of wills,
Louisiana requires a signature to appear “at the end of the testament.”243
Thankfully, Louisiana courts have interpreted this requirement liberally.244
236. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1575, 1577.
237. Schmidt, Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with Particular
Reference to Brazil, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 103.
238. Italian law, however, requires a signature at the end so as to indicate a
“‘conscious seal of the intent manifested in the document.’” Braun, Testamentary
Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 129.
239. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. II, c.3 (Eng.); ATKINSON, supra note 176,
at 255.
240. Lamayne v. Stanley, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (1681).
241. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 256–57.
242. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1588 (1870).
243. Id. arts. 1575, 1577.
244. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 309; see also Succession of Fitzhugh, 127
So. 386 (La. 1930).
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Given the new placement requirement for the signature on olographic
wills, the Civil Code has adopted a permissive approach and makes clear
that if the signature does appear at the end, “the testament shall not be
invalid.”245 Rather, any writing appearing after the signature “may be
considered by the court, in its discretion, as part of the testament.”246 For
notarial wills, however, no such flexibility for the courts is written into the
Civil Code. Article 1577 merely states that the testator “shall sign his name
at the end of the testament and on each other separate page.”247
The discrepancy between olographic wills in article 1575 and notarial
wills in article 1577 did not always exist. In 1999, when the revision to the
law on donations went into effect, article 1575 read:
An olographic testament is one entirely written, dated, and signed
in the handwriting of the testator. It is subject to no other
requirement as to form.
Additions and deletions on the testament may be given effect only
if made by the hand of the testator.
This language, of course, is substantively the same as the 1870 Civil Code
and, in fact, prior versions of the Civil Code as well. Under the prior law,
the jurisprudence had imposed yet another requirement—that the will be
signed at the end—and the court in Succession of King held invalid an
olographic will that the decedent had not signed at the end.248 Although
the court observed that the Louisiana Supreme Court had relaxed the
formalities for wills, the court noted that “the requirement that the
testatrix’s signature be affixed to the end of an olographic will has not been
relaxed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.”249 Far from being an idle
formality, the requirement that the testator’s signature be at the end of the
will, according to the court, is “to show that the provisions preceding the
signature are approved by the testatrix. Furthermore, the placement of the
signature at the end conclusively demonstrates that there are no other
provisions.”250 In light of this requirement, the court concluded that it

245. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Succession of King, 595 So.2d 805, 809 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992),
overruled on other grounds by Act. No. 824, 2001 La. Acts 1718.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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could “only speculate as to whether or not there were any other provisions
in Mrs. King’s will.”251
Consequently, an amendment to article 1575 was necessary to reverse
the outcome of Succession of King.252 In 2001, article 1575 was amended
to include the following language:
Although the date may appear anywhere in the testament, the
testator must sign the testament at the end of the testament. If
anything is written by the testator after his signature, the testament
shall not be invalid and such writing may be considered by the
court, in its discretion, as part of the testament . . . . The date is
sufficiently indicated if the day, month, and year are reasonably
ascertainable from information in the testament, as clarified by
extrinsic evidence, if necessary.253
For both olographic and notarial wills, though, the requirement
remains that the will should be signed at the end. But “[w]here is the end
of a will?”254 For olographic wills, the answer may be clearer, namely, at
a place on the document with no writing that follows or, put simply, the
“part that is furthest from the beginning.”255 For a notarial will, however,
the answer is a bit murkier. Certainly, “if a dispositive provision is clearly
below or after the testator’s signature, the will is not signed at the end.”256
But a notarial will in Louisiana must also include an attestation clause
signed by the witnesses and the notary, which almost always follows the
dispositive provisions of the testator’s will. If the testator signs after the
dispositive provisions, but not after the attestation clause, has he signed
the will at the end?
Both the comments to Civil Code article 1577 and the jurisprudence
from the Louisiana Supreme Court suggest that the end of the will is after
the dispositive or appointive provisions of the will, not after the attestation
clause. Specifically, comment (b) to article 1577 states that “[t]he testator
need not sign after both the dispositive or appointive provisions of th[e]
testament and the declaration, although the validity of the document is not
affected by such a ‘double’ signature . . . . He need only sign at the end of
the dispositive, appointive or directive provisions.”257
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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In Succession of Guezuraga, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered
the validity of a will that had been signed at the end of the dispositive
provisions but not on the last page, which contained “only the conclusion
of the attestation clause.”258 Citing common law commentators, the Court
noted that the attestation clause is not regarded as part of the testator’s
will.259 Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he testator does not have to sign
again following the attestation clause.”260 An earlier decision by the
Louisiana Supreme Court on the same issue regarding statutory wills was
similarly decided,261 although the lower courts had indicated to the
contrary.262 The result in Guezuraga is to be celebrated as a sensible and
flexible application of the rules on will formalities. Strictly speaking,
however, one may well question the rationale. An attestation clause for a
common law will is not part of the testator’s will because the attestation
clause is not required in other states. Under article 1577, however, it is an
absolute requirement for the validity of a notarial will.
Nevertheless, one would hope that for both olographic or notarial
wills, a court would uphold the will irrespective of the location of the
signature—for example, the beginning, the middle, the end, the exordium
clause, or the margin—if the court “is convinced that the instrument is the
complete will intended by the testator.”263 The Restatement suggests a
reasonable approach, namely, “[t]he testator’s handwritten name in
freestanding form at the end of the document unquestionably satisfies the
signature requirement. The testator’s handwritten name in freestanding
form at any other place on the document raises an inference that the
testator ‘signed’ the document.”264 The Uniform Law on International
Wills also requires a signature at the end, but it does not consider it a core
formality; thus, its placement elsewhere does not affect the validity of the
will.265

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Succession of Porche, 288 So. 2d 27 (La. 1973).
Succession of Wilson, 213 So. 2d 776 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 310.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 1999).
265. UNIF. INT’L WILLS ACT arts. 1, 6; see also Zimmermann, Testamentary
Formalities in Germany, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 466.
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C. Date
Finally, the requirement of a date is clearly stated as a prerequisite for
both notarial and olographic wills.266 This prerequisite is perhaps the most
curious of the common formality requirements. Although legal
documents—for obvious reasons—are commonly dated, few transactions
specifically require the existence of a date as a condition of the validity of
the transaction.267 In the context of wills, however, the law is clear—an
olographic testament has to be “entirely written, dated, and signed in the
handwriting of the testator,”268 and a notarial will “shall be prepared in
writing and dated.”269 Although Louisiana law has always required a date
for an olographic will, the same is not true for notarial wills. The date
requirement was mysteriously added in 1999. Prior to then, the statutory
will, on which the notarial will is based, did not require a date.270
1. What Is a Date?
In the etymological sense, the word “date” derives from the Latin word
datum, referring to “both the time and place of the execution of an act.”271
Today, however, it is commonly accepted that the word “date” refers only
to the time of an act, not the place.272 Civil law sources agree with this
modern definition, although Spanish law still requires the notary to state
266. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1575 & 1577.
267. Importantly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recently upheld an undated
revocation of a will because “there is no requirement in La. C.C. art. 1833 or any
other article of the Louisiana Civil Code that requires an authentic act contain the
date on which it was executed.” Succession of Robin, 286 So. 3d 396, 402 (La.
2019).
268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575.
269. Id. art. 1577.
270. Lemuel E. Hawsey, III, Louisiana’s Statutory Will: The Role of Formal
Requirements, 32 LA. L. REV. 452, 459 (1972):
Although neither the statute nor the jurisprudence make the date a formal
requirement for validity of a statutory will, it is still necessary to
determine whether some general principle at either common or civil law
necessitates inclusion of the date of execution in order for a testament to
be valid. The Louisiana Wills Statute had as its origin similar statutes
existing in all of the common law states. It is well settled at common law
that, in the absence of an express statutory requirement, the date of
execution is not essential to the validity of a statutory will.
271. K.A. CROSS, CROSS ON SUCCESSIONS 200 (1894).
272. See Date, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “date” as
“[t]he day when an event happened or will happen”).
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the place of execution.273 Although the Code Napoléon was silent on how
specific the temporal indication must be, an ordinance from 1735, which
has been kept in force by the jurisprudence, prescribes the inclusion of “the
day, month, and year.”274 Louisiana law provides the same for olographic
wills but does not specifically provide what constitutes a “date” in the
context of a notarial will.275 Reasoning in pari materia, one may assume
the requirements are the same, especially in light of the attestation clause
requirement for notarial wills, which requires the execution of a statement
by the witnesses regarding compliance with the formalities and the
“subscri[ption] [of their] names this __ day of __, ____.”276
The date may be written in a number of forms, including: (1) words—
for example, the first day of January in the year 1999; (2) numerals, such
as 1/31/99, 1-31-99, or 1.31.99; (3) some combination of words and
numerals—for instance, January 31, 1999, January 31, ’99’, or Jan. 31,
’99; and even (4) colloquial expressions, such as “New Year’s Day ’99.”277
Questions, however, may exist as to the exact date when slash or numeric
dates are used and when both the first and second numbers are below 12.
For example, does “2/3/99” reference February 3, 1999, or March 2, 1999?
Although it is customary in Europe and elsewhere to write the month in
the second place, the custom in the United States is the opposite, and one
should presume that 2/3/99 refers to February 2 and not March 3 of the
year 1999.278 In fact, an early Louisiana Attorney General Opinion
counseled that “[t]he date of an olographic will should not be written in a
way so frequently used in dating letters. For example, today’s date should

273. 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 2. No. 2711, at 318 (La.
State L. Inst. trans., 1959); Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 79; Pintens, Testamentary
Formalities in France and Belgium, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note
44, at 465.
274. PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 318 n.27.
275. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577.
276. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577.
277. PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 318 n.27. See also Succession of Heinemann,
136 So. 51 (La. 1931) (holding that an olographic will was valid when the date
was written as “Jan 2-1930,” despite a challenge that the month should be written
in full and that the word “Jan” was written “without even a period to denote the
abbreviation”). The Court in Heinemann noted that “‘Jan 2-1930,’ means January
2, 1930, and cannot mean anything else . . . . The absence of the period to denote
the abbreviation is of no importance. The abbreviation is sufficiently manifest
without it.” Id.
278. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. (e) (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
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not be written ‘7/10/42,’ but should be written ‘July 10, 1942.’”279 Eminent
authority has posited that “[a]bbreviations are permissible, unless they
render the date uncertain. Thus, the abbreviation 9/8/18 is insufficient
because according to certain usage this would refer to September 8th and
by other custom to August 9th.”280 And, in fact, early Louisiana courts
invalidated wills with slash dates, such as “10/3/50,”281 “12.10.1934,”282
and “9/8/18,”283 because in all such cases the date was uncertain.
Happily, under current Louisiana law, extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to clarify an ambiguous date.284 Extrinsic evidence, however,
must render the day, month, and year “reasonably ascertainable.”285 In
Succession of Raiford, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an
olographic will dated “Monday.8 1968.”286 Even after the admission of
extrinsic evidence, the Court concluded that “[t]he only certain thing about
the date here is the year 1968. The figure 8 could reflect either the day or
the month,” and Louisiana law requires the establishment of a day, month,
and year.287 Thus, “the will [was] invalid.”288 Other decisions from the
Louisiana Supreme Court have been equally clear that “the month, without
the day, is no date” at all.289
2. Location of the Date
Originally, there was some dispute regarding where the date must
appear. Many French sources held the view that the date could appear
anywhere in the will—the beginning, the end, or the body.290 Some
sources, however, called this into question.291 The Louisiana Supreme
Court, relying on French sources, clarified the matter and held that the date
279. La. Att’y Gen. Op. 1942, 773.
280. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 308–09.
281. Succession of Mayer, 144 So. 2d 896 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
282. Succession of Lasseigne, 181 So. 879 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
283. Succession of Beird, 82 So. 881 (La. 1919).
284. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575 (2018).
285. Id.
286. Succession of Raiford, 404 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. 1981).
287. Id. at 253.
288. Id.
289. Succession of Holloway, 531 So. 2d 431, 433 (La. 1988); Heffner v.
Heffner, 20 So. 281 (La. 1896).
290. PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 318.
291. CROSS, supra note 271, at 201–02 (arguing that “[t]here would be even
room to fear that the testament would be declared null if the signature precedes
the date”).
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could appear anywhere in an olographic will.292 Subsequent cases
reaffirmed this conclusion and held that the date was sufficient if it was
contained in the head of the will, at the foot, or in the body.293 Other courts
classified the location of the date in an olographic will as “immaterial.”294
Still other courts held that the date could appear even on the “reverse side”
of the page on which the testator disposed of her property.295 It is now
beyond doubt that the location of the date in an olographic will is
unimportant and that the date “may appear anywhere in the testament.”296
In fact, article 1575 of the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 2001 to
codify jurisprudence holding that the location of the date in a testament is
irrelevant. One presumes that the same rule would and should apply in a
notarial will, although the Civil Code is silent on this matter.
3. The Need for a Date?
Although the rules for the location and specificity of a date are clear,
what remains to be ascertained is why a date is required at all. Some
justifications that scholars have offered include the importance of
ascertaining the order of multiple wills and the need to “determine whether
the will was made while the testator was competent.”297 Although these
justifications are undoubtedly valid, many questions remain. For instance,
suppose a testator makes two wills on the same day. Should the exact time
be required as part of the date to avoid uncertainty as to the order?298 More
importantly, why should a will be invalid due to the absence of a date or
an imperfect date when no question exists regarding the testator’s capacity
or the existence of another will? Perhaps most bizarrely, Louisiana courts
have found that as long as a will is dated, it does not matter if the date is
correct.299 In Succession of Roniger, the court allowed oral testimony to
292. Succession of Fuqua, 27 La. Ann. 271, 273 (1875) (stating that “[i]t is not
essential that the date to an olographic will should precede the signature; it may
be placed below”).
293. Jones v. Kyle, 123 So. 306 (La. 1929).
294. Zerega v. Percival, 15 So. 476 (La. 1894).
295. Succession of Barnett, 245 So. 2d 418 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
296. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575 (2019).
297. PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 319; see also MALAURIE & BRENNER, supra
note 223, at 295.
298. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 59 (noting that the hour is not
required as part of the date for a holographic will).
299. Succession of Roniger, 706 So. 2d 1025 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998). But
see PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 319 (“A false date and an incomplete date are
equivalent in that they both cause a nullity of the will. The case law is well
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establish that a will dated December 12, 1996—10 months after the
decedent died—was actually executed on January 12, 1996.300 Similarly,
in Succession of Dawson, the court probated a will and allowed testimony
from the drafter of a notarial will that was dated February 28, 2103.301 One
wonders what help a false date would be in ascertaining the order of
multiple wills or the timing of the testator’s capacity. If extrinsic evidence
is allowed when a date is wrong, incomplete, or unclear, why is it not
similarly allowed when a date is absent? Louisiana courts should be
praised for thinking expansively and avoiding unnecessary formalism in
many instances, but the approach on this issue has not always been
consistent. Some courts have held invalid wills that contain dates if the
dates are illegible.302 Other courts, however, have been more liberal with
this requirement and found that a will can be valid even if it is dated after
the will is completed303 or if it contains multiple dates because it was
written on different days.304
Be that as it may, Louisiana law still requires a date, although this was
not always the case in every instance. In Succession of Gordon, the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered “whether the omission of the day of
the month in the attestation clause invalidates” a statutory will.305
Although the Court noted that it is “not only desirable but legally
advantageous that this type of will and all wills be dated,” it held that
statutory wills did “not require a date in the testament” for the will to be
valid.306 Shortly thereafter, however, the legislature amended the statute to
provide that a statutory will “shall be dated.”307 Today, Louisiana
jurisprudence is clear that a date is still essential for a will.308 Although
“[e]xtrinsic evidence may be considered to clarify an ambiguous date, . . .
established in that sense. It has been criticized acidly as formalism and
legalism.”).
300. Roniger, 706 So. 2d at 1028.
301. Succession of Dawson, 210 So. 3d 421 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
302. Succession of Wenling, 135 So. 21 (La. 1931).
303. Jones v. Kyle, 123 So. 306 (La. 1929); Succession of Picard, 155 So. 11
(La. 1934).
304. Succession of Fitzhugh, 127 So. 386 (La. 1930); Oroszy v. Burkard, 158
So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
305. Succession of Gordon, 245 So. 2d 319, 320 (La. 1971).
306. Id.
307. La. Acts 1974, No. 246; see also Succession of Holloway, 531 So. 2d 431
(La. 1988).
308. Succession of Aycock, 819 So. 2d 290 (La. 2002); Succession of Boyd,
306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975); Succession of Lefort, 71 So. 215 (La. 1916); In re
Succession of Lain, 147 So. 3d 1204 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014); Succession of
Holloway, 531 So. 2d 431 (La. 1988).
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extrinsic evidence may not be provided for an absent date.”309 Twice now,
in fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has agreed in stating that “[a]n absent
date cannot be supplied.”310 In fact, for an olographic will, a date written
by one other than the testator, such as by a notary, is not valid and results
in an invalid will.311
When the issue of a date was debated in the Louisiana State Law
Institute in 1972, the Council rejected the Successions and Donations
Committee’s proposal and voted not to require a date in a will as a matter
of substance. Wood Brown spoke eloquently and noted that to require a
date for a statutory will would be “a step backward” because
“[n]uncupative wills and mystic wills do not require a date.”312
The Uniform Probate Code has also entirely abandoned the date
requirement for wills.313 The Québec Civil Code similarly no longer
requires a date for a witnessed or an olographic will.314 Common law
authority has also stated that a “date is not an essential part of the will,”
and thus a “will is not rendered invalid” by an erroneous date or no date at
all.315 Louisiana law, however, still clings to the requirement of a precise
date that specifies the day, month, and year.316 Although French law in
principle contains the same requirement, the modern tendency of French
courts is to require a date “only if there is a problem concerning capacity
or chronology, and the will is only void when, due to an incomplete date,
it is impossible to determine if the will was written when the testator had
capacity or to chart the order of competing wills.”317 Although the
Louisiana Civil Code allows for the date to be “clarified by extrinsic

309. In re Succession of Lain, 147 So. 3d 1204 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014).
310. Succession of Boyd, 306 So. 2d 687, 692 (La. 1975); Succession of
Aycock, 819 So. 2d 290 (La. 2002).
311. Succession of Aycock, 819 So. 2d 290 (La. 2002) (invalidating an
olographic will where the notary had filled in the date).
312. Minutes of the April 7–8, 1972 Meeting of the Council of the Louisiana
State Law Institute at 3–4; see also Succession of Holloway, 531 So. 2d 431, 435
(La. 1988) (C.J. Dixon, dissenting).
313. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502.
314. QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE arts. 726–30; see also Judy Martin, La Pertinence
de l’Article 714 du Code Civil du Québec ou le Paradoxe d’un Formalisme Sujet
à la Libre Interprétation des Tribunaux, 113 REVUE DU NOTARIAT 431, 486
(2011) (“Au Québec, la date ne constitue pas un élément essentiel du testament
olographe ou devant témoins.”).
315. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.7, at 22.
316. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1575, 1577 (2018).
317. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
Testamentary Formalities, supra note 44, at 59.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 388

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

WILL FORMALITIES IN LOUISIANA

1377

evidence, if necessary,”318 the French Cour de Cassation has demonstrated
a willingness to accept even a completely undated will “when, on the basis
of extrinsic evidence confirmed by intrinsic evidence, it can be
demonstrated that the will dates from a particular period.”319 Specifically,
the French court noted that despite the absence of a date, the olographic
will was valid because it was not demonstrated that the will was written
during a period when the testator was incapable or that the testator
executed a revocatory or incompatible will.320 Some Belgian courts have
followed the French lead on this issue, and it is hoped that a Louisiana
court would act similarly.
Perhaps the best approach can be observed in German law, which
requires a holographic will to be “written and signed in [the testator’s] own
hand,” but then recommends that the “testator should state in the
declaration the time when (day, month and year) and the place where he
wrote it down.”321 German law also sensibly provides that if the will “does
not contain any information about the time when it was made and where
this causes doubts about its validity, the will is to be deemed to be valid
only if the necessary ascertainments about the time when it was made can
be established in some other manner.”322 The Uniform Law on
International Wills also requires a date but does not consider it a core
formality, so its absence does not affect the validity of the will.323 Italian
law requires a handwritten date for a holographic will to be valid but treats
a will as merely voidable, rather than void, in the absence of a date.324
Louisiana’s codal insistence on a date, although motivated by good
reasons, now seems overly strict and out of step with the modern approach
to will formalities in both civil and common law jurisdictions. Unlike other
requirements that ensure validity and authenticity of the testament, the date
requirement seems useful, but it is only necessary in isolated cases.
Accordingly, “when the date is not needed to guarantee validity, because
there are no problems concerning capacity or competing wills, it does not

318. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575.
319. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
Testamentary Formalities, supra note 44, at 60.
320. Cass. 1re civ., 10 Mai. 2007, No. 05-14366.
321. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 2247(1), (2).
322. Id. § 2247(5).
323. UNIF. INT’L WILLS ACT arts. 1, 7; see also Zimmermann, Testamentary
Formalities in Germany, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 466.
324. Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 128.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 389

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1378

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

make sense to insist on its presence.”325 Some have characterized this
approach as a “logical consequence of an evolution from an absolute
formal requirement to an additional guarantee of validity.”326 Justice
Lemmon, dissenting in the Raiford case, observed similarly in concluding
that a will dated only by the year ought to be valid when the purposes for
which the date is required—that is, competency of the testator and order
of multiple wills—are not thwarted.327 Commentators have likewise
criticized a strict rule requiring a date and argued that “[o]ne need only say
that the ‘date’ must be sufficient to resolve those controversies present in
the case for which the date was intended.”328 In short, the hypothetical
value of the date requirement is far exceeded by the litigation cost imposed
on challenging wills. In reviewing over a dozen cases involving challenges
to wills due to an insufficient date, Justice Dixon aptly explained:
It is interesting to note that in none of the cases involving dates in
olographic wills were the dates of any significance or relevance,
except to fulfill the codal requirement that the will be written,
dated, and signed by the testator. It is easy to see that, without a
history, it might be assumed by early jurists in Louisiana that there
would be occasions the correct date of a will would be of
significance, to decide, for example, it was written before or after
the birth of a child, or whether it was the last of two wills, or
whether it was written when the decedent had testamentary
capacity. That occasion surely will arise, but it has not yet proved
a significant reason for requiring precision in the date.329
The date requirement and the other common formalities for wills in
Louisiana have been longstanding formalities for wills. The times,
however, have changed. So too have the laws in other jurisdictions. It is
time for the law in Louisiana to change as well to keep up not only with

325. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 60.
326. Id.
327. Succession of Raiford, 404 So. 2d 251 (La. 1981) (Lemmon, J.,
dissenting).
328. H. Alston Johnson, Successions and Donations, 43 LA. L. REV. 585, 601
(1982).
329. Succession of Boyd, 306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975); see also Succession of
Raiford, 404 So. 2d at 254 (Lemmon, J., dissenting) (arguing that a will dated
“1968” should be valid because it establishes “the point in time of its making
sufficiently to show that this will was made later than the 1963 will in which the
decedent left the property to her brother”).
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societal developments but also with the changes in the laws in similar
states and countries.
IV. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF OLOGRAPHIC WILLS
In addition to the general requirements of a writing, a date, and a
signature by the testator, Louisiana’s rules on olographic wills also contain
some additional special requirements. Specifically, under Louisiana law,
an olographic will must be “entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testator . . . . The olographic testament is subject to no
other requirement as to form.”330 The ease of execution for an olographic
will is a notable—and somewhat surprising—departure from the strictures
of any of Louisiana’s prior will forms and, in fact, even from the current
alternative, the notarial will. Unlike the notarial will and its “statutory”
predecessor, the olographic will is purely a civil law product. Only about
half of the states in the United States have adopted the “holographic”
form,331 which is common in civil law countries.332
As explained by one scholar:
The dominant theory today appears to be that holographic wills as
we now know of them today probably originated in the customs
of the people of France during the later Middle Ages, and that
these merely customary institutes were given lasting sanction in
the sixteenth century when customary law was written down.333
After olographic wills were sanctioned by the Code Napoléon, they
gradually passed into the civil law of other countries and eventually into
selected common law regimes.334
Olographic wills, however, were not unknown even to Roman
lawyers.335 From the 5th century, the concept of a olographic will existed
330. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575 (2018).
331. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.2, Statutory Note (AM. LAW INST. 1999); SCHOENBLUM, supra
note 4, § 20.2.
332. See, e.g., C. CIV. art. 970 (Fr.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] §
2247; CODICE CIVILE art. 602; GREEK CIVIL CODE art 1721 (Constantin
Taliadoros trans., 2000); CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN art. 688 (Julio Romanach Jr. trans.,
2994); QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE 726e; but see Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in
the Netherlands, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 147–61.
333. Richard Helmholtz, The Origins of the Holographic Will in English Law,
15 J. LEG. HISTORY 97, 98 (1994).
334. Id. at 98.
335. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 27, at 1.
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in parts of the Roman empire.336 An imperial constitution by Valentinian
III provided that a will “could be made without the presence of witnesses
. . . if it was written in its entirety by the testator in his own hand.”337 This
new form of will, however, was of “little consequence” because it was
“only valid in the western part of the empire, and it did not make it into
Justinian’s codes.”338 Later, however, in Novel 114, Justinian provided
that:
If anyone who knows how to write should wish to divide his estate
among his children, he must first put down the date with his
signature; next he must inscribe the names of his children with his
own hand; and then he must indicate the shares for which he
appoints them heirs by completely writing them out, and not by
merely expressing them in numerals, in order that said shares may
be exactly known and free from all doubt.339
Despite early recognition of the olographic will under Roman law, it
was not universally received early on by civil law jurisdictions. In fact,
there was limited use of the olographic will in the pays de droit écrit, that
is, the area of France governed by written, rather than customary, law prior
to enactment of the Code Napoléon.340 Such olographic wills existed in
French customary law and were further endorsed in France via the
Ordonnance of 1735.341 When the Code Civil was enacted, article 969
provided that “[a] testament may be olographic, or made by public act, or
in the mystic form.”342 An olographic will under the Code Napoléon was
stated to be one that was “entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator.”343 It was “subject to no other form.”344 The olographic will
also made its way into Scottish law, the Austrian Civil Code, and the

336. Id.
337. Thomas Rüfner, Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 19.
338. Id.
339. JUSTINIAN NOV. CONSTIT. 114, in S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (1932);
Nils Jansen, Testamentary Formalities in Early Modern Europe, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 42.
340. See also GRIMALDI, supra note 180, at 271.
341. Jansen, Testamentary Formalities in Early Modern Europe, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 43.
342. C. CIV. art. 969 (1804) (Fr.).
343. Id. art. 970.
344. Id.
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Italian Civil Code.345 Although it was originally resisted in German law,346
today § 2247 of the German Civil Code allows olographic wills.347 In the
modern day in France, the olographic will is heralded as the most practical
form of will in France.348 Olographic wills also exist in Latin American
counties, such as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama,
and Peru.349
From French law, the olographic will was exported to Louisiana and
was enacted as part of the Digest of 1808. The drafters of the 1808 Digest,
however, appended additional language providing that the olographic will
could be “open or sealed,” but when sealed it needed to contain a
“superscription” signed by the testator stating that the document was “my
olographic will or codicil.”350 Although not required, the Digest of 1808
suggested that it would be “prudent to deposit [the will] with a notary to
prevent its being purloined.”351 Interestingly, when the Civil Code was
revised in 1825, the original proposal of the drafters was to impose
additional requirements that an olographic will “have the signatures of two
witnesses, to whom the testator [had] declared that the paper which he
offers them to sign is his testament.”352 The drafters explained their
thought process as follows:
It appears to us, as the art of counterfeiting writing has been
carried to such an extent, that it is no longer safe to admit as certain
a testament, which has no other proof of its verity than the handwriting of the testator. A testament may be made in one or two
lines . . . . To be beyond the reach of this danger, we require that
the olographic testament should have the signature of two
witnesses; and in order that the testator be not bound to reveal to
them its contents, we do not oblige him to read it to them.353
The above proposal, however, was never enacted. Instead, the 1825 Civil
Code adopted a streamlined version of the prior article and modeled it
345. Jansen, Testamentary Formalities in Early Modern Europe, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 43.
346. Id.
347. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 2247.
348. MALAURIE & BRENNER, supra note 223, at 254 (describing the olographic
will as “beaucoup la plus pratiquée en France”).
349. Schmidt, Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with Particular
Reference to Brazil, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 109–10.
350. LA. CIV. CODE art. 103 (1808).
351. Id.
352. 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES 214 (1937).
353. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 27, at 23–28.
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heavily on the French Civil Code, which requires that the will be “entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator” with no other form
requirements.354 The same provision was retained in the 1870 revision355
and is largely reflected in current law today.356
A. Handwriting
Obviously, what distinguishes an olographic will from others is that
the olographic will is in the handwriting of the testator.357 Webster’s Third
New International Unabridged Dictionary defines handwriting as a
“writing in which the hand forms the letters with a pen, pencil, stylus, or
similar writing implement.”358 Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines
handwriting as a “person’s chirography; the cast or form of writing
peculiar to a person, including the size, shape, and style of letters, and
whatever gives individuality to one’s writing.”359 Some have posited that
the “use of hand printing or block lettering satisfies the handwriting
requirement.”360 Pen, pencil, or a combination of the two should suffice as
long as the testator himself utilized the medium for writing.361 Typewritten
documents or documents confected with stamps are clearly insufficient.362
From the Anglo-American perspective, in which attested wills are the
norm, the reason for allowing holographic wills is that the “testator’s
handwriting provides an adequate substitute for the presence of
witnesses.”363 From a civil law perspective, olographic wills are not
second-best substitutes to attested wills. They developed over a thousand
years ago in Roman times and have long been present in civil law.

354. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1581 (1825).
355. Id. art. 1588 (1870).
356. Id. art. 1575.
357. For a recent case in which the court denied probate of a purported
olographic will on the basis that the will was written by another who tried to
simulate the handwriting of the testator, see Succession of Olsen, __ So.3d __,
2020 WL 465560 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2020).
358. 2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED,
1028 (1986).
359. Handwriting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
360. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 20.5, at 275.
361. Id.; Succession of Smart, 36 So. 2d 639 (La. 1948).
362. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 20.5, at 275–76.
363. Helmholtz, supra note 333, at 97.
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B. “Entirely” in the Testator’s Handwriting
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, an olographic will must be “entirely”
written, dated, and signed in the testator’s hand.364 Consequently, in
addition to the dispositive provisions and, obviously, the signature, the
date must be in testator’s handwriting.365 Although decided under the prior
version of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
noted that if part of the date is completed by someone other than the
testator, the entire will is invalid.366 In fact, courts have been quite rigid in
requiring the date to be in the handwriting of the testator. In Succession of
Robertson, the Court held invalid an olographic will in which the first three
digits of the date—that is, 189—were in print, and the testator merely
supplied the last numeral.367 The Court reasoned that “when the printed
matter is ignored,” it “rendered the date nonexistent.”368 Although this
result seems dictated by legislation, the policy underlying it is
questionable, especially in light of the general insignificance of the date.
A question has also arisen as to the exact meaning of the word
“entirely.” Scholars have characterized olographic will laws that require
the will to be “entirely” written in the testator’s handwriting—like
Louisiana’s Civil Code article—as “first-generation” provisions,
presumably because these types of provisions were the first kinds of
olographic will statutes adopted in the United States. Obviously, the
dispositive provisions, the date, and the signature—the essential elements
of the will—must be in the testator’s handwriting, but what if the will
contains nonessential or superfluous elements that are typewritten or
preprinted? Louisiana has adopted the “surplusage” approach to this
problem, which, stated briefly, provides that “the portions of the document
in the testator’s handwriting are given effect as a holographic will if they
make sense as a will standing alone.”369
One of the earlier Louisiana cases on this matter is Andrew’s Heirs v.
Andrew’s Executors, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the
presence of witness signatures on an olographic will did not invalidate it
merely because of the presence of writing not in the hand of the testator.
The Court upheld the validity of an olographic will to which the witnesses
364. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575 (2018).
365. Id.
366. Succession of Robertson, 21 So. 586 (La. 1897); see also ATKINSON,
supra note 176, at 308 (citing similar court decisions from other states).
367. Succession of Robertson, 21 So. 586.
368. Id.
369. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
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attested because their signatures, which were at the bottom of the will and
“ma[d]e no part of it,” could be ignored as surplusage, and the remainder
of the document in the testator’s handwriting could be probated.370
Similarly, in Heirs of McMichael v. Bankston, the plaintiff alleged that
an olographic will was invalid because it was not “wholly written” by the
testator.371 Specifically, there were two words in the will, the word “to” in
the sixth line and the word “acres” in the eighth line, which were
apparently written by someone else.372 Nonetheless, the Court enforced the
will because “the presence or absence of the two words can have no
material effect upon the meaning or contents of the will.373 The Court
noted that “we may safely . . . consider them as not written, and not impair
the validity or effect of the will.”374 Similarly, in Succession of
Heinemann, the children of the deceased, who were omitted from his
olographic will, sought to annul the will on, among other grounds, the
basis that the will was written on letterhead of the New Orleans Baseball
and Amusement Company and the place, “New Orleans, La.” was in print
rather than handwritten.375 In evaluating the arguments of the plaintiff, the
Court noted that the printing of the location was not challenged by the
plaintiff because the plaintiff “correctly recognized that the place where
the will is written is properly no part of the date of the will and may be
disregarded, as not appearing, without affecting the validity of the will.”376
The surplusage approach, however, does not universally mandate the
deletion of all preprinted material and the probate of the remaining
handwritten parts of a will. In some instances, the handwritten material is
insufficient to constitute an olographic will and thus cannot be given
effect. In Succession of Plummer, the plaintiff sought to probate as an
olographic will a revocable living trust with handwritten instructions
designating the beneficiaries and directing the management and division
of the trust upon his death.377 The court found that the handwritten material
alone did not evidence testamentary intent.378 Unlike prior cases, the court
noted that the trust instrument consisted of “several pages of printed words
that are an essential part of the trust instrument.”379 The handwritten
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
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Andrew’s Heirs v. Andrew’s Executors, 12 Mart. (o.s.) 713 (La. 1823).
Heirs of McMichael v. Bankston, 24 La. Ann. 451 (La. 1872).
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Succession of Heinemann, 136 So. 51 (La. 1931).
Id. at 52.
Succession of Plummer, 847 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189–90.
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portion was “inseparable” from the trust, and “all pages are essential to the
confection of the trust document.”380 In distinguishing it from previous
cases involving preprinted stationery or letterhead, the court concluded
that it could not “ignore the printed words of the trust document because
they are inextricably tied to and form an integral part of the entire
document, thus negating the formal requirement that the will be entirely
written in the hand of the testator.”381
Louisiana’s “surplusage” approach, however, is not the only way in
which preprinted matter in olographic wills could be handled. Secondgeneration holographic will statutes tend to be modeled on the original
Uniform Probate Code provision and require only that the “signature and
the material provisions” of the olographic will be in the handwriting of the
testator.382 This approach breaks from first-generation statutes and makes
clear that the will need not be “entirely” in the testator’s handwriting and
that both the handwritten and non-handwritten portions are part of the
will.383 Even under this more permissive approach, however, questions
exist as to validity of a provision disposing of property to a legatee where
a boilerplate portion of the provision contains typewritten words of
disposition, such as “give, devise, and bequeath,” and only the name of the
legatee and the identity of the property are handwritten.
To address the above problem, some states have enacted so-called
third-generation statutes that are modeled upon a newer version of the
Uniform Probate Code, promulgated in 2008. These statutes require only
that the “signature and material portions of the document” be in the
testator’s handwriting.384 As explained in the Restatement:
[T]he purpose of changing from “material provisions” to “material
portions” was to leave no doubt about the validity of a will in
which immaterial parts of a dispositive provision—such as “I
give, devise, and bequeath”—are not in the testator’s handwriting.
The material portion of a dispositive provision—which must be in
the testator’s handwriting under the Revised Uniform Probate
Code—are the words identifying the property and the devisee.385

380. Id. at 190.
381. Id.
382. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
383. Id. § 3.2 cmt. b.
384. Id. § 3.2 cmt. a.
385. Id. § 3.2 cmt. b.
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Just as with the common will formalities, the particular will
formalities for olographic wills have been part of the Louisiana law for
decades, if not centuries. Louisiana’s interpretation of these additional
formalities is somewhat traditional and has largely remained unchanged.
Although comparative research does not mandate the adoption by
Louisiana of the more permissive approaches taken elsewhere, practical
wisdom suggests that the Louisiana experience should at least be informed
by these alternative approaches.
V. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF NOTARIAL WILLS
Just as for olographic wills, additional special requirements exist for
notarial wills in Louisiana. Although many, if not all, of these
requirements can be traced back to the statutory will, the formalities
imposed for statutory wills were intended to make will execution easy and
efficient, and the requirements were historically interpreted liberally to
further that purpose. Despite this purpose and approach, as far back as the
1960s, commentators have noted that “the formalities prescribed [for
statutory and now notarial wills] . . . continue[] to be a source of
litigation.”386
A. Signed at the End of Each Page and at the End of the Testament
The requirement that every page of the notarial will be signed appears
to be a somewhat unique Louisiana rule copied, most likely, from the same
innovation imposed upon statutory wills. As with the requirement of a
date, it is no doubt good practice—perhaps, best practice—to sign every
page of the will to eliminate any doubt as to the authenticity of the entirety
of the will. One court has observed that “[t]he purpose of the requirement
is to prevent fraud by the substitution of one typewritten page for another
after the execution of the will by the testator.”387 Some scholars have
similarly noted that “[t]he logic behind this rule is to make it impossible
to remove or exchange pages.”388 Although a laudable goal, indeed, once
again, Louisiana’s codification of this best practice has served as an enemy
of the good.
In addition, if the signing of each page of a notarial will is an absolute
requirement, why then is the testator of an olographic will required to sign
386. Carlos E. Lazarus, Successions and Donations—The Work of the
Appellate Courts—1968–1969, 30 LA. L. REV. 197, 205 (1969).
387. Succession of Hoyt, 303 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
388. Vékás, Testamentary Formalities in Hungary, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 260.
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only at the end? Perhaps the handwritten nature of an olographic will is
enough protection to ensure validity and authenticity, and, no doubt,
olographic wills are much less likely than notarial ones to be multi-paged.
But surely the existence of the notary—if not the two witnesses—provides
a similar safeguard in the context of a notarial will, especially when a
lawyer or notary may retain a copy of the will and could testify as to the
authenticity of each page. Nonetheless, this requirement exists solely for
notarial wills,389 and, although good practice, the requirement that each
page be signed has wrought substantial havoc in Louisiana law. For
instance, in Succession of Hoyt, a Louisiana court declared invalid a twopage will that was signed only on the last page.390 The court noted that
“[t]he failure of the testator to sign each sheet is fatal to the validity of the
will.”391 Similarly, in Land v. Succession of Newsom, the court found that
failure to sign each page of a two-page will was “fatal” to the validity of
the entire will.392
More recently, in In re Hendricks, the testator executed a multi-page
notarial will in which it was “undisputed that [the testator] did not sign one
of the pages of the . . . testament that contained dispositive provisions in
favor of his three sisters.” 393 In distinguishing Succession of Guezuraga,
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a will not signed on the page
containing only the “conclusion of the attestation clause,” the court in
Hendricks noted that the “attestation clause is a certificate to a will and not
part of the will itself,” whereas the dispositive provisions are of primary
concern to the testator.394 Thus, the court concluded that “the formalities
prescribed for the execution of a testament [we]re not observed, [and,
consequently,] the [entire] testament [wa]s absolutely null.”395
Additionally, in Successions of Toney, the Louisiana Supreme Court
invalidated a will that admittedly contained a number of deviations from
the requirements for notarial wills prescribed in the Louisiana Civil Code.
Notable for present purposes, however, was the Court’s following
observation:

389. Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in the France and Belgium, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 61 (noting in the context of a
holographic will that a testator is not required to sign every page of the will).
390. Succession of Hoyt, 303 So. 2d 189.
391. Id.
392. Land v. Succession of Newsom, 193 So. 2d 411 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1966).
393. In re Hendricks, 28 So. 3d 1057, 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
394. Id. at 1063.
395. Id.
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[I]n this case, the first two pages of the will are not signed, but are
only initialed “R.T.” Further, the initials are in print rather than
cursive writing. Although signatures come in a variety of forms,
and although a few appellate courts have upheld wills where some
pages were initialed rather than signed, we note that La. Civ. Code
art. 1557(1) unambiguously requires the testator to “sign his name
at the end of the testament and on each other separate page,” and
merely initialing undoubtedly falls short of this requirement.
Particularly where, as here, the initials are written in easily
imitable print rather than cursive, we are hesitant to find that this
deviation from the codal requirement is merely minor or
technical.396
Given the general flexibility of the signature requirement and the
traditionally liberal application of this requirement, the outcome of
Successions of Toney is puzzling. It is even more concerning when one
realizes that the liberality with which courts have treated signatures is
longstanding. Before the change to the law in 1999, Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2442 required that the testator “sign each separate sheet of the
instrument.”397 Several Louisiana courts interpreted the signature
requirement permissively. In fact, in Succession of Butler, the court was
clear that any mark or X can constitute a signature. The court explained
that “[w]e are of the opinion that the words ‘signed’ and ‘signature’
appearing in this statute do not mean that a testator must literally write his
or her name. An ‘X’ mark, properly witnessed, fulfills the requirement
thereof in this respect.”398 Another court in Succession of Anderson echoed
this sentiment by holding:
[W]e think an “X” mark placed on the will by the testator, with
the intent that the affixing of that mark constitutes a signing of the
will, fulfills the requirement that the will be signed by the testator.
This is particularly true in a case such as this where the testator
does not know how or is not able to sign his name.399
Curiously, in neither Toney nor Hendricks was there even a hint or
suggestion that foul play was involved. No claim was made that someone
inserted the unsigned page in the will in place of another page.
Nonetheless, the courts strictly followed the written law. In fact, in both
396.
397.
398.
399.
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Hendricks and Toney, the courts noted the absence of any argument of
impropriety, other than, of course, failure to follow the form requirements.
The Hendricks court, like so many courts before it, recognized the
hardship but expressed concern about the slippery slope:
The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of
it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal
requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance,
since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a
fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and imposition.400
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Toney observed that
“[a]lthough fraud was not alleged at the trial court level, signing one’s
name on each page of the will undoubtedly offers more heightened
protection from surreptitious replacement of pages than mere initialing,
particularly when the initialing is in print rather than cursive as is found
here.”401
Although some of the above judicial interpretations are undoubtedly
stricter than one might hope, one can hardly fault the courts for following
the law. Nevertheless, it is hard not to be reminded of the colloquy between
Mr. Brownlow and Mr. Bumble in the famous novel, Oliver Twist,
whereby the former accuses the latter of being responsible for conduct that
Mr. Bumble attributes to his own wife. After being accused by Mr.
Brownlow of being “the more guilty of the two, in the eye of the law; for
the law supposes that your wife acts under your direction,” Mr. Bumble
emphatically responds: “If the law supposes that . . . the law is a ass—a
idiot. If that’s the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst I wish
the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience—by experience.”402
So too should the law, in this instance, have its eyes opened by experience.
Experience has shown that although good practice would encourage
the signing of every page, it should hardly be an absolute bar to a will’s
validity. This approach holds true especially when no fraud or similar
allegation is made and when the testator made some identifying mark, such
as initialing, to indicate his assent to the will’s provisions. Some out-ofstate practitioners explain:
[I]t is a common or “best” practice, but not required by law, for
the testator to sign or initial every page of a traditional paper will,
as a low-tech safeguard against later substitution of an altered
400. In re Hendricks, 28 So. 3d 1057 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
401. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 404–05.
402. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 403 (1867) (Bantam Classic ed. 1981).
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page. A more extreme safeguard is to fasten the pages of the paper
will together, before signing, using brass rivets or eyelets along
the top.403
Experience from other jurisdictions and conventions is likewise
illuminating. The Uniform Law on International Wills also requires a
signature on every page, but it does not consider it a core formality; thus,
its absence does not affect the validity of the will.404 Similarly, Hungarian
law requires that the pages be “consecutively numbered and signed by the
testator,” although only partial invalidity is the consequence under
Hungarian law for failing to sign every page.405 Spanish law requires that
a testator sign each page only for closed or secret wills, which have all but
disappeared in practice.406 Brazilian law also requires that multi-page
typed documents be only initialed on every page.407 Dutch law provides
that every page of a notarial deed must “be initialed, except, of course, for
the last page which must be signed.”408 Although the French Civil Code
does not require that a public will be initialed on every page by the testator,
French notarial law requires that “each page be initialed by the notary and
the signatories to the act under the penalty of nullity of pages of the act not
initialed.”409 A recent case from the Cour de Cassation has made clear that
in executed wills, notaries must comply not only with the French Civil
Code, but also with French notarial law.410 Thus, the court held invalid a
public will that had not been initialed by the testator.411 Louisiana law is
perhaps the harshest, insofar as failure to sign, rather than initial, every
single page results in complete invalidity of the will.412 Although perhaps

403. Jeffrey S. Dible, “Electronic Wills” in Indiana: Answers to FrequentlyAsked Questions at 6, (on file with author).
404. UNIF. INT’L WILLS ACT arts. 1, 6; see also Zimmermann, Testamentary
Formalities in Germany, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 466.
405. Vékás, Testamentary Formalities in Hungary, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 260.
406. Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 82, 89.
407. Schmidt, Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with Particular
Reference to Brazil, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 103.
408. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 167.
409. Decret, No. 71-941, art. 9, 26 Nov. 1971.
410. Cass. 1re civ., 10 Oct. 2012, No. 11-20702.
411. Id.; see also MALAURIE & BRENNER, supra note 223, at 300 (“S’il
comporte plusiers feuillets, tous doivent ȇtre paraphés.”).
412. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397, 404 (La. 2017).
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some jurisdiction may impose an even more rigid formality on this matter
than Louisiana, the present author has not found such a place or rule.
B. Executed in the Presence of a Notary and Two Witnesses
The requirements of a notary and two witnesses for notarial wills are
easy to state but deceptively complex in practice. As explained below,
there is ambiguity in the meaning of term “presence,” which is only
magnified by the double requirement of Louisiana law that the testator sign
in the presence of the notary and witnesses and that they sign in the
presence of the testator and each other. In addition, Louisiana wills have
at times been plagued by the problem of unqualified notaries. Finally, the
law has had to grapple with the correct number of qualified and
disinterested witnesses.
1. The “Presence” Requirement
In Louisiana, the requirement that a notarial will be signed by a notary
and two witnesses does not merely require that they must sign the will;
rather, they must sign in the “presence” of the testator and each other, and
the testator must sign in their “presence” as well. Although civil law
nuncupative wills historically had to be dictated by the testator and written
in the presence of witnesses,413 the dual presence requirement of the
current law was likely taken from statutes in other states at the time of
enactment of the statutory will and probably owes its genesis to the
English Wills Act of 1837.414
The current law, however, leaves many unanswered questions. First,
why must the testator sign in the presence of the witnesses and the notary?
Under prior law, a testator could execute a nuncupative will by private act
outside of the presence of the witnesses if he “presented the paper” on
which it was written and “declar[ed] to them that that paper contain[ed]
his last will.”415 The requirement that the testator sign in the presence of
the witnesses and the notary is, perhaps, the easiest of the unanswered
questions to explain. It is not an uncommon requirement that documents
be executed before a notary and two witnesses, commonly known as an

413. Richard v. Richard, 57 So. 28 (La. 1912) (holding a will invalid when it
was not “dictated by the testator or written by the notary in the presence of the
witnesses”).
414. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. p (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
415. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1581 (1871) (repealed).
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authentic act.416 The purpose behind this requirement is to instill an “air of
solemnity and formality created by the execution of an act before a notary
and witnesses, designed to fulfill a cautionary function and induce the
parties to a final reflection on the wisdom of the act.”417 Although a strong
argument could be made for allowing a testator to sign his will in private
and thereafter acknowledge it before a notary—or even a notary and two
witnesses—such a formality, commonly known as an act duly
acknowledged, would not receive the same level of proof as an authentic
act418 and cannot currently “substitute for an authentic act.”419 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has held similarly in Succession of Pope, a case
in which the testator signed his will while in his office and in the presence
of two witnesses.420 The testator thereafter “repaired to the courthouse
(about two or three blocks away from the office of the deceased)
where . . . [the notary] affixed his signature in the presence of the testator
and . . . one of the witnesses.”421 The Court, with little discussion, declared
the will invalid for failure to follow the “mandatory provisions of the
statute.”422
Second, why must the witnesses and the notary, after having witnessed
the testator sign, then sign in the presence of the testator? Some have
suggested that the purpose of this requirement is to make certain that the
will being signed is the will of the testator. Although this argument might
sound facially appealing, it does not withstand scrutiny. If the concern is
that the witnesses have signed a forged document not actually signed by
the testator, surely allowing the testator to acknowledge his will to the
witnesses would suffice. The fact that the testator happens to be out of the
room when the witnesses sign, after having heard the testator’s
acknowledgement and after having seen him sign, seems irrelevant. If the
concern is that the “entire transaction is fictitious, it is as easy to testify to
the presence of the testator as to any other facts which did not happen.”423
Moreover, “[i]f the will is the real expression of testator’s wishes and his
name thereto is genuine, it is difficult to see what opportunity there is for
substitution by permitting the witnesses to sign out of [the testator’s]
416. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833.
417. SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 12.7, in 5 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2001).
418. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1835, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836.
419. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836.
420. Succession of Pope, 89 So. 2d 894, 898 (La. 1956), overruled on other
grounds by Succession of Jenkins, 481 So. 2d 607 (La. 1986).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.120, at 210–11.
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presence.”424 The real effect of this requirement, it is suggested, is to
“render invalid a great many wills which are genuine expressions of the
testator’s wishes.”425
Third, why must the witnesses and the notary sign in the presence of
each other? Imagine a scenario in which a testator signs his will in the
presence of a notary and two witnesses, after which one witness signs in
the presence of all other parties but is then called away by an emergency.
After the first witness leaves, the second witness signs in the presence of
the testator and the notary, and the notary signs in the presence of the
testator and the remaining witness. Under Louisiana law, the above will
would be invalid because the second witness and the notary did not sign
in the presence of the first witness, and article 1577 requires that each
witness and the notary sign “[i]n the presence of the testator and each
other.”426
Again, it is worth remembering that this presence requirement is taken
from the English Wills Act as it was adapted into the law of other states in
the mid-20th century. Prior law on nuncupative wills did not require the
witnesses to sign the will in the presence of each other. In fact, in
Succession of Bush, the plaintiff alleged that the will was invalid because
“the witnesses did not affix their names in the presence of each other.”427
The Court noted that although the requirement that the witnesses sign in
each other’s presence had been stated in dicta, there was “no specific
provision of the Civil Code obligating the witnesses to sign in the presence
of each other.”428 Nevertheless, the Court quickly dismissed the argument,
as “the preponderating evidence establishe[d] that the witnesses signed in
the presence of each other.”429 In Stephens v. Adger, the Court even more
emphatically declared that a nuncupative will by private act “does not
require the signing of the will by the witnesses in each other’s presence”
because there is “no provision requiring the witnesses to affix their
signatures to the will at the same time, or that it shall be signed
simultaneously or that the witnesses shall act in concert with each
other.”430
Fourth and finally, what is meant by the term “presence”? As noted by
the Restatement, “[t]here are two interpretations of the presence
requirement, the line-of-vision presence and the conscious-presence
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
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test.”431 Under the line-of-sight test, “the witnesses [and notary] must sign
within the testator’s ‘line of vision,’” as well as the line of vision of each
other.432 If the line-of-sight test is adopted, it is noteworthy that the literal
language of article 1577—that is, “in the presence”—does not require the
parties “to have watched [each other] sign, as long as [they] could have
watched [each other] sign.”433 The jurisprudence, however, suggests that
the presence requirement may require that the parties actually witness the
signing, rather than merely finding that they could have witnessed it. In
Succession of Daigle, the court noted that “the record supports the trial
court’s finding that the purported witnesses did not actually witness the
testatrix’s signature nor did they sign in the presence of the notary, the
testatrix, and each other.”434
In discussing the line-of-sight test, some authority has suggested that
acts done in the same room should be prima facie evidence that they are
done in the presence of the parties, whereas those done in different rooms
should be prima facie evidence of the opposite.435 Under the line-of-sight
test, however:
Two persons are [also] in the presence of each other if they are in
the adjoining offices separated by a window which is raised, and
through which each can see the other; or if one of them is outside
the office on the street, but they can see each other through the
office window.436
In contrast, the Restatement adopts the “conscious presence” test,
rather than the “line-of-sight” test.437 In explaining its rationale, the
drafters note that:
A person can sense the presence or actions of another without
seeing the other person. If the testator and the witnesses are near
enough to be able to sense each other’s presence, typically by
being within earshot of one another, so that the testator knows

431. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. p (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Succession of Daigle, 601 So. 2d 10, 13 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added).
435. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.122, at 215.
436. Id.
437. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, § 3.1 cmt. p.
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what is occurring, the presence requirement is satisfied.438
At least one case in Louisiana appears to have explicitly adopted the
line-of-sight test. Namely, in Succession of Smith, a Louisiana court of
appeal reversed a trial court that held invalid a will that was confected by
a testator from a hospital bed and that was witnessed by two nurses, one
of whom observed the testator sign not from the room itself but while
standing in the doorway.439 The court stated: “When a testator signs a will
in a small hospital room, a witness may see the signing more clearly from
outside of the doorway than if a testator signed the document in a much
larger room in which the witness was standing at the other end.”440
Nonetheless, the court still found the will to be invalid because the notary
and the witnesses signed the will later at the nurses’ station and outside of
the presence of the testator. Thus, even though they observed the testator
sign the will, the “presence” requirement for notarial wills was not met.441
Whichever type of presence interpretation the Louisiana courts adopt, the
matter is doubly important in this state, which requires both that the
testator be “[i]n the presence of the notary and two competent witnesses”
and that the notary and the witnesses be “[i]n the presence of the testator
and each other.”442
The Uniform Probate Code has, by and large, eliminated the
“presence” requirement altogether. Under § 2-502, the will must be signed
by two witnesses, “each of whom signed within a reasonable time after the
individual witnessed either the signing of the will . . . or the testator’s
acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgement of the will.”443
Thus, not only does the Uniform Probate Code allow for witnesses to sign
after they have witnessed the event, but it even allows them—as many
states do—to sign as witnesses when the testator has only acknowledged
his signature or will to them after he has executed it.444 Moreover, the
comments to the Uniform Probate Code are clear that signing “within a
reasonable time after” witnessing the testator’s signing or
438. Id.
439. Succession of Smith, 806 So. 2d 909 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2002)
(invalidating a will that was signed by two witnesses when one of the witnesses
testified that the witnesses were not present at the time the testator signed the will
and that they signed the will later in their respective homes outside the presence
of the testator).
440. Id. at 912.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502.
444. Id.
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acknowledgment could be satisfied by a signing that occurs after the death
of the testator.445 After all, “[t]here is . . . no requirement that the witnesses
sign before the testator’s death.”446 In one instance, however, the Uniform
Probate Code retains a “presence” requirement, namely, if the will is
signed at the testator’s direction by someone other than the testator. If such
is the case, the person signing on behalf of the testator may only do so if
he signs in the testator’s “conscious presence” and at the “testator’s
direction.”447
2. The Notarial Requirement
A notarial will, as its name suggests, requires the presence and signing
by a notary. The office of notary is a public office appointed by the
governor and conferred after an applicant has met various qualifications.448
Notaries, as a general matter, maintain a parish-wide commission and are
authorized to perform certain legal functions within the jurisdiction of
their parishes.449 Persons licensed to practice law in Louisiana and those
notaries who have taken and passed the notarial examination after June 13,
2005, however, may exercise the functions of a notary public in every
parish in this state.450
The requirement of a notary is common in Louisiana, especially for
gratuitous transfers. The general rule for donations inter vivos is that they
must be executed before a notary and two witnesses. The notarial will, of
course, adds even more formalities, such as signing on every page and the
requirement of an attestation clause. Be that as it may, some basic notarial
rules are applicable for wills just the same. The notary must sign in his
official capacity and not in his private capacity as a mere witness.451
Similarly, a private witnessed writing that is subsequently acknowledged
before a notary will not suffice to meet the requirements of a notarial
will.452
Despite the commonality of the notary requirement in Louisiana, two
matters merit consideration: (1) the problem of unqualified notaries; and
(2) the problem of interested notaries. On occasion, courts have had to
consider the effects of a notary who exercises notarial functions outside of
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
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his jurisdiction or of attorneys who are disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law who persist in exercising notarial functions.453 The Civil
Code purports to answer the question in article 1834 by stating that “[a]n
act that fails to be authentic because of the lack of competence or capacity
of the notary public . . . may still be valid as an act under private
signature.”454 Eminent authority has concurred in stating that “an act
executed before a notary without jurisdiction in the parish where the act
takes place is not an act executed before a competent notary and therefore
is not authentic.”455 Nonetheless, courts have created a safety net for some
transactions pursuant to the “de facto officer” doctrine, which allows some
individuals to be treated as notaries and other officers, even though “under
the law . . . [they have] no right or title to that office.”456 The idea of de
facto officers is well rooted in Louisiana jurisprudence and, as some have
noted, dates back to 1830.457
As stated in jurisprudence, the de facto officer doctrine generally has
three requirements: (1) “[t]he office involved must exist as a de
jure office”; (2) “the holder must have attained that office under some
color of title”; and (3) the holder “must be in actual physical possession of
the office.”458 Under the first requirement, the party claiming to occupy a
de facto office can only do so if a de jure office of the same title exists.
For example, one cannot claim to occupy the de facto position of Holy
Roman Emperor because such an office no longer exists. More pertinently,
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Garnier v. Louisiana Milk Commission
evaluated a claim by a party that he occupied a position on the Milk
Commission because the statute named, as an ex officio member, the
Secretary of the Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, a position to
which he had been appointed.459 Because no such position actually existed,
453. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 35:14:
Any attorney at law, or person who was an attorney at law, who is
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law due to charges filed by
the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Louisiana State Bar
Association or who has consented to disbarment shall not be qualified or
eligible nor shall he exercise any functions as a notary public in any
parish of the state of Louisiana as long as he remains disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.
454. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1834 (2019).
455. LITVINOFF, supra note 417, § 12.21.
456. Henry J. Dauterive, Jr., Comment, De Facto Public Officers in Louisiana,
12 LA. L. REV. 200, 200 (1952).
457. Id.
458. Succession of Wafer, 715 So. 2d 672, 674 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
459. Garnier v. Louisiana Milk Commission, 8 So. 2d 611 (La. 1942).
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the plaintiff claimed that that he was a de facto, rather than de jure, member
of the commission, as he was in possession of the office “under apparent
color of title.”460 The Court denied the claim on the basis “that one may
not claim to be a de facto officer unless there is a de jure office in
existence.”461 In the context of wills, however, this element is rarely a
problem, “given that the office of Notary Public exists by statute, [such
that this] first requirement is clearly met.”462
Under the second requirement, the holder must have attained that
office under some color of title. In other words, the doctrine is only
applicable for individuals who “have achieved this position . . . by virtue
of some appointment or election, however irregular or informal.”463 Thus,
a usurper with no legitimate claim or color of title to an office cannot
utilize the de facto officer doctrine. The policy behind this requirement is
that the individual claiming de facto status has some reputation for holding
the office he now assumes, and the general public has acquiesced to his
authority.464 A private citizen with no colorable claim to or reputation for
holding the office of notary public who takes it upon himself to notarize
wills is likely not the type of person who could benefit from the de facto
notary doctrine.
Under the third and final requirement, the claimant must be in actual
physical possession of the office.465 The jurisprudence has not extensively
discussed this requirement, but it appears that “actual physical possession”
requires a “good faith[] and faithful exercise of the functions of the
office.”466 Thus, those who innocently or perhaps negligently exercise
notarial functions after their right to do so has ceased likely have a valid
claim to a “good faith” exercise of the functions of the notarial office.
The de facto doctrine has received regular application in relation to
notarization, especially in the context of wills. For example, in Succession
of Wafer, a notary commissioned in Natchitoches Parish notarized a
statutory will in Bienville Parish—a parish where she did not have de jure
authority.467 The court noted that the prerequisites for the de facto notary
doctrine were met and that the notary had on at least one other occasion
notarized documents in Bienville Parish.468 Similarly, in Succession of
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
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Succession of Wafer, 715 So. 2d at 674.
Dauterive, supra note 456, at 205; Succession of Wafer, 715 So. 2d at 674.
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Sampognaro, the court held valid a will notarized by a disbarred lawyer
by virtue of his exercise of the powers of a de facto notary.469 In so holding,
the court noted that the disbarred lawyer had applied for and received a
notarial commission after his disbarment, and there was no evidence
indicating that the decedent understood that the disbarred attorney was
unqualified to notarize her will.470
The de facto notary doctrine, although routine in its application in
these contexts, is not universally accepted by courts. For example, in
Succession of Plauche, the court rejected application of the de facto notary
doctrine and found invalid a will executed by an attorney who was
suspended from the practice of law.471 The court noted that the attorney
remained suspended when he notarized the will—an action in violation of
the law, which prohibited him from exercising notarial functions.472
Because the attorney was prohibited from acting as a notary on the day
that the will was executed, the will was not properly executed and was
therefore invalid.473
Assuming the notary is validly commissioned, another potential
stumbling block exists, namely, the prohibition that the notary to the will
may not be a legatee to the will that is being notarized.474 This issue is not
new in Louisiana law. Even before a Civil Code article on the topic
existed, the jurisprudence was clear that a notary to the will could not also
be a legatee. In Succession of Purkert, the Louisiana Supreme Court
explained that, even in the absence of an express prohibition in the Civil
Code, a “notary public cannot serve as such in any deed to which he is a
party or which is made directly to him personally,” as he “acts in a quasijudicial capacity, not only in the making of nuncupative wills by public
act, but in many proceedings which are had before notaries public.”475
Cases, however, were clear that the will itself was not invalid, but the
legacy to the notary was ineffective.476 Additionally, if the notary
renounced his legacy, the defect in the will was cured.477 Current law
continues the prohibition on interested notaries and now makes abundantly
clear that the will is not invalid, but the legacy to the notary or the spouse

469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
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Id.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1582 (2018).
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of the notary is not valid.478 There is no rule, as exists for witnesses
(discussed below), that allows notaries who would otherwise be intestate
heirs of the testator to continue to inherit. As the comments to article 1582
observe, the notary “performs a more solemn function than the witnesses
and is a public officer. The notary remains prohibited from taking under
the testament.”479
3. The Witness Requirement
Just as with authentic acts in general, notarization alone is not
sufficient for a notarial will; it also requires the signatures of two
witnesses. The witness requirement for notarial wills is directly connected
with the statutory will, which was a product of the Anglo-American
attested will that required a will to be attested by two witnesses. The
requirement of attestation by witnesses became prevalent with the Statute
of Frauds of 1677.480 Prior to then, the only requirement under the Statute
of Wills of 1540 was that devises be in writing, but even then this
requirement pertained only to personal property. Land was not subject to
probate at all in 1677.481 The Statute of Frauds was passed to curb fraud
and forgery, which were prevalent in the 16th century, and to create a
reliable substitute to probate land.482 Despite the obvious change in the
legal landscape between 1677 and the present day, two witnesses are still
required today under Louisiana law. Just as with notaries, however, issues
of qualifications exist, as does the concern for interested witnesses.
a. Capacity to Be a Witness
Stated simply, “[a] person cannot be a witness to any testament if he
is insane, blind, under the age of sixteen, or unable to sign his name.”483
This capacity requirement is clearly designed to ensure that witnesses to
wills have some minimum level of understanding of the role, an ability to
read the necessary attestation clause, and the capability of signing the same
attestation clause. Nonetheless, the terminology employed in article 1581
is somewhat antiquated and cryptic, particularly the reference to insanity.
Although standards for capacity are common throughout the Louisiana
478. Id.
479. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1582 cmt. (b).
480. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 17.
481. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68
N.C. L. REV. 541, 551 (1990); see also Lindgren, supra note 23, at 1029–30.
482. Lindgren, supra note 481, at 552.
483. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1581.
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Civil Code, the standard for insanity is not. Other provisions of law
disqualify those who are interdicted from performing certain legal acts,
but the Louisiana Supreme Court, in interpreting prior law, has held that
the standards for insanity and interdiction are not the same.484 Although
article 1581 was revised as recently as 1997, the “insanity” standard
appears to be a throwback from old law and prior days.
The capacity rule for witnesses in Louisiana is not derived from
French law, which provides that “[w]itnesses called to be present at
testaments must understand the French language and be majors, know how
to sign and have the enjoyment of their civil rights. They may be of one or
the other sex but a husband and a wife may not be witnesses to the same
act.”485 The capacity rule in Louisiana is also different from other states
where no special qualities are required, and witnesses need only be
“generally competent.”486 Although some states set a minimum age of 14
or 18 to witness wills, most do not and generally allow anyone who is
“able to understand the significance of an oath” to be a witness, even if the
witness is a minor.487 Additionally, for wills executed by testators who are
unable to read, a witness “who is competent but deaf or unable to read
cannot be a witness to [that testator’s] notarial testament under Article
1579.”488 This approach seems sensible enough, as witnesses under article
1579 must listen to the reading of the will and follow along on a copy.
The rules on witness competency today are based on the rules under
article 1591 from 1870.489 Prior law made clear that the prohibition
imposed was one of “absolute incapa[city],” such that violation of the rule
results in an absolute nullity.490 The same should be true today because an
incompetent witness to a notarial will would mean that the will was not
executed in compliance with the prescribed formalities. Unlike the de facto
484. Succession of Koerkel, 76 So. 2d 730 (La. 1954).
485. C. CIV. art. 980. The original provision in the Code Napoléon also fails
to correspond to Louisiana law on this topic. See CODE NAPOLÉON art. 980 (1804).
The de la Vergne manuscript references Spanish law and Domat, but neither are
particularly good matches. See, e.g., A REPRINT OF MOREAU LISLET’S COPY OF A
DIGEST, supra note 26, at 230-32; see also 2 THE LAWS OF THE SIETE PARTIDAS,
supra note 26, at 964.
486. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-505(a); MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 205;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.1 cmt. o (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
487. MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 205; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 3.1 cmt. (o).
488. Id.
489. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1591 (1870).
490. See id.
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officer doctrine for incompetent notaries, there is no de facto doctrine for
witnesses. The consequence is harsh, but a will witnessed by an
incompetent witness is absolutely null.
b. “Disinterested” Witnesses
In addition to capacity, Louisiana law also requires witnesses to a will
to be disinterested. Specifically, a witness may be neither a legatee nor a
spouse of a legatee.491 This prohibition is longstanding in Louisiana law.
Prior to current article 1582, article 1592 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 declared that for nuncupative wills, “[n]either can testaments be
witnessed by those who are constituted heirs or named legatees, under
whatsoever title it may be.”492 The question remained, however, as to the
applicability of this prohibition to statutory wills, which originally
contained no such explicit prohibition in Title 9. The Court in Evans v.
Evans held that the prohibition in the prior article 1592 applied equally to
statutory wills, and thus the entire will was invalid when a witness was
interested.493 The Court reasoned that it had previously held in Succession
of Eck that the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code should be
incorporated into the law on statutory wills.494 As such, the prohibition on
interested witnesses applied with equal force to a statutory will.495 In so
holding, the Court reversed the lower courts, which had held merely that
the legacy to the witness was invalid. The Court noted, however, that the
sanction provided in the Civil Code for noncompliance with the
formalities of wills is that the will is “null and void.”496
It is not an uncommon requirement that a witness not be a legatee.
French law has long prohibited interested witnesses.497 The same is true in
common law courts, where “a person who had a direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the litigation[] was incompetent to testify.”498 The result,
491. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1582, 1582.1.
492. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1592 (1870).
493. Evans v. Evans, 410 So. 2d 729, 731–32 (La. 1981).
494. Id. (citing Succession of Eck, 98 So. 2d 181 (La. 1957)).
495. Id.
496. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 1595 (1870)); see also Johnson, supra note
328, at 602–03 (suggesting that the solution of the court, although properly
reasoned, may be “too extreme” and that perhaps legislative attention is required).
497. C. CIV. art. 975 (Fr.); see also Pintens, Testamentary Formalities in
France and Belgium, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 62;
PLANIOL, supra note 273, at 330.
498. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.80, at 152; EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS
J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 5:4 (2d ed. 1999).
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of course, was that the entire will could not be probated. This harsh result
was changed in England by statute in 1752, such that the will was not
invalid, but the legacy to the witness was voided.499 This same approach
continued in the English Wills Act of 1837.500 These so-called “purging”
statutes, which upheld the will but purged the interested legatee of his
legacy, became popular throughout the United States.501
Of course, the “purging” rule may also be excessively onerous because
children or descendants of the testator who witness a will would, even in
the absence of the will, inherit from the decedent. Thus, their status as
“interested” witnesses seems weaker or even nonexistent in the context in
which a witness may receive more in intestacy than he would have
received under the will. In fact, a witness who does not receive more under
the will than he would under intestacy arguably is not an “interested”
witness at all.502 As a result:
[M]ost American purging statues provide a partial exception for a
devisee who is also an heir of the testator or a devisee under the
testator’s prior will. Under this exception, an heir or devisee
forfeits only that portion of his or her devise that exceeds the
amount that he or she would have taken by intestacy or under a
prior will if the will in question were invalid.503
Even this prohibition, however, has been subject to criticism by scholars
who have argued that “[s]ome requirements, like the one that witnesses be
disinterested, probably do more harm than good; for every attempted fraud
which these rules prevent, hundreds of genuine wills may be defeated by
them.”504 The Uniform Probate Code has abandoned the requirement of
disinterested witnesses and now provides that “[t]he signing of a will by
an interested witness does not invalidate the will or any provision of it.”505
The drafters explain their rationale, which is not to “foster the use of
interested witnesses,” but to delete the previous penalty associated with
499. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 157.
500. Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict. c. 26 (1837).
501. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 157; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1, at 175 (AM. LAW
INST. 1999); MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 206; SCHOENBLUM, supra note
4, § 19.87, at 160–62.
502. MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 207; SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, §
19.86, at 160.
503. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. o, at 176.
504. MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 199.
505. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-505(b).
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the formality because it does “not increase appreciably the opportunity for
fraud or undue influence.”506 After all, a legatee who is a witness to a will
is “itself a suspicious circumstance” that could likely be challenged on the
grounds of undue influence.507
Louisiana, however, goes even further in prohibiting not only legatees
from witnessing wills but also spouses of legatees from witnessing wills.
The prohibition on a spouse of a legatee was originally enacted in 2003 in
Civil Code article 1582.1. It was not part of the prior law, and, in fact, the
jurisprudence was previously clear that a legacy to the husband of a
witness was not prohibited.508 Moreover, this new prohibition was not
included in the revision to the law of donations proposed by the Louisiana
State Law Institute in 1997. Rather, it was added later without the input of
the Law Institute. In fact, the original prohibition on spouses of witnesses
was done quite inartfully and was even more restrictive than the
prohibition on legacies to witnesses. It provided that “[a] spouse of a
legatee may not be a witness to any testament. The fact that a witness is
the spouse of a legatee does not invalidate the testament; however, a legacy
to a witness’ spouse is invalid.”509 The next year, the provision was
modified to adopt the purging rule that was applicable for legacies to
witnesses.510 The article contains no comments to explain its rationale, and
the rule contained within it is certainly not prominent in other states.
English courts, however, have held that the interested witness statute
applies to spouses of legatees, and the statutory law was amended to make
that clear.511 The English Wills Act provides that:
If any person shall attest the execution of any will to whom or to
whose wife or husband any beneficial devise, legacy, estate,
interest, gift, or appointment . . . shall be thereby given or made,
such devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment shall, so
far only as concerns such person attesting the execution of such
will, or the wife or husband of such person, or any person claiming
under such person or wife or husband, be utterly null and void,
and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness to prove
the execution of such will, or to prove the validity or invalidity
Id. § 2-505(b) cmt.
Id.
Succession of Eck, 98 So. 2d 181 (La. 1957).
La. Acts 2003, No. 707.
La. Acts 2004, No. 231.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. o (AM. LAW INST. 1999); see also 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict., c.
26, § 15.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
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thereof, notwithstanding such devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift,
or appointment mentioned in such will.512
In the United States, however, “the spouse of a devisee is not an
‘interested’ witness unless the purging statute expressly voids all or a
portion of a devise to a devisee if his or her spouse serves as an attesting
witness.”513 Few states in the United States extend their purging statute as
far. One exception is Connecticut, which provides that:
Every devise or bequest given in any will or codicil to a
subscribing witness, or to the husband or wife of such subscribing
witness, shall be void unless such will or codicil is legally attested
without the signature of such witness, or unless such devisee or
legatee is an heir to the testator.514
Louisiana, of course, does the same. Few cases, however, seem to have
arisen in Louisiana in which witnesses or spouses of witnesses have
abused their position to obtain an improper disposition from the
testator. Surely, the notary serves some protective function against
witness misconduct, and one wonders whether the “interested”
witnesses rule should be reexamined or at least tempered in Louisiana
in light of experience both at home and in other states.
c. “Two” Witnesses and Supernumerary Witnesses
The idea of two witnesses signing the testator’s will reminds one of
the requirements of an authentic act, but it likely originated in the English
Wills Act of 1837, which required “two or more witnesses” to attest to the
testator’s signing.515 Modern American legislation almost universally
requires two witnesses, although three were previously not uncommon,516
and “a will which [wa]s subscribed by a less[er] number of competent
witnesses [wa]s invalid.”517 Extra witnesses, sometimes called
“supernumerary” witnesses, are acceptable,518 and they may also receive
512. Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict. c. 26 (1837).
513. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS§ 3.1 cmt. o.
514. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-258 (2019).
515. Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9 (Eng).
516. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.75, at 144; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. o.
517. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.75, at 144.
518. MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 207.
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legacies without the will being jeopardized or the legacy being purged.519
By the same rationale, “if a will can be probated as a holograph, a devise
to a subscribing witness is valid.”520
French law still requires that public wills be executed before a notary
and two witnesses, unless two notaries are present, in which case no
witnesses are needed.521 Québec law has separate types of wills, some of
which can be notarized with one witness and others that can be witnessed
but without the need of a notary.522 German law does not require witnesses
and allows wills under holographic form or by declaration to a notary.523
Spanish law has virtually abolished the witness requirement for notarized
wills since 1991, save very exceptional cases. The logic behind the
abolition of witnesses is that “the presence of a notary more than
sufficiently cover[s] the ritual role that was previously filled by
witnesses.”524 Furthermore, although witnesses originally were viewed as
a check on the testator in Dutch law, “this role was increasingly seen as
being redundant . . . [and] the requirement of the presence of witnesses
constituted a failure to appreciate the role of the notary.”525 In the
Netherlands, the requirement of two witnesses was abolished for notarial
deeds, other than wills, in 1971.526 In 2003, “this requirement was finally
also abolished for wills; deeds are now only executed in the presence of
two witnesses if the notary so requires.”527 In a subsequent case involving
a will under the old law, the Dutch Supreme Court also upheld a will
executed before a notary when the witnesses were in an adjacent room and
not present at the time of execution.528 In so ruling, the court
acknowledged the significance of the notary insofar as his presence, rather
than that of the witnesses, was “a sufficient guarantee that the will is not
void or voidable just because the witness rule has not been obeyed in the
correct way.”529

Id.
Id.; Succession of Morgan, 938 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
C. CIV. art. 971 (Fr.).
QUÉBEC CIV. CODE arts. 716 & 727.
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] §§ 2231–2247.
Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 87–88.
525. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 168–69.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 172.
529. Id.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
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Even model legislation in America—a culture without the same
historically significant role for notaries as in civil law countries—now
provides that a will executed before a notary needs no witnesses at all.530
Statutes to this effect have been adopted in Colorado and North Dakota.531
The rationale is that the professional notary serves the same protective
function under the law as witnesses, perhaps even more so. Some have
even called for the abolition of witness attestation altogether because the
purposes for which it was established have changed. “Fraud is rare,” James
Lindgren writes, “nor is attestation likely to prevent it.”532 Other scholars
have noted that the witnessing requirement is not apt to prevent the fraud
or forgery it is designed to prevent.533
C. Publication: Declared by the Testator to Be His Will
In addition to the myriad other requirements for a notarial will,
Louisiana is one of the small number of states to require “publication” of
a will.534 Publication, simply stated, is “the declaration by the testator that
the instrument is his will.”535 Today, publication is required only by very
few states.536 No major statutory enactment has ever required it, and it is
difficult to understand today why this formality remains. Specifically,
publication was not required by the English Wills Act, the Statute of
Frauds, or by any version of the Uniform Probate Code.537 Although
English courts imposed such a requirement at one point, the courts have
long since abandoned it.538
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with having the testator
declare to the witnesses that the document is his will. In fact, it generally
seems like good practice for that to occur. But why would a document that
evidences testamentary intent by, among other things, stating that it is the
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02.
Lindgren, supra note 481, at 573.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 8, at 10–12.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (noting that only a few states
require publication of will to the attesting witnesses).
535. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 278.
536. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, § 3.1 cmt. h; see generally ARK. CODE § 28-25-103; IOWA CODE §
633.279; N.Y EST. POWER & TRUST LAW § 3-2.1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 84:55;
TENN. CODE § 32-1-104.
537. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. (h).
538. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 278.
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testator’s last will and testament be invalid because the testator forgets to
declare or signify this to the witnesses? Finding a valid policy reason
strains the imagination because no other witnessed transaction requires the
witnesses to know the character of the document they are witnessing. The
witnesses, after all, are not attesting to the substantive contents or validity
of the will. They are merely attesting to the signing by the testator. A
testator’s acknowledgement of his signature, however, does not meet the
publication requirement, nor does a mere request by the testator that the
witnesses sign the instrument.539
Why would it be relevant for the witnesses to know that the signature
they are witnessing is on a will rather than a real estate contract? Some
have suggested that perhaps the “publication” by the testator “tend[s] to
fix the transaction in the witnesses’ minds to call their attention to the
question of mental competency of the testator.”540 But witnesses are not
expected to know or understand the various nuances and differences in the
substantive law of consent or capacity for wills versus real estate
transactions.541 Others suggest that some American states require
“publication” in an effort to “drive home to the testator that the document
being signed is the testator’s will.”542 But this too is odd because ordinarily
the draftsman of the will, such as a lawyer, could achieve this same end by
explaining to his client that this is a will, rather than having the testator
declare it to the witnesses. Writing in the 1940s, Atkinson astutely
observed that any value achieved by publication “is more than overcome
by the undesirability of overturning a will because the testator has omitted
to declare the testamentary character or because the witnesses fail to
remember this.”543 Regrettably, however, Atkinson reports that in the few
states that do require publication, “absence of this formality is fatal to the
validity of the will.”544
Somewhat ironically, the publication requirement harkens back to the
forms of will that Louisiana previously abrogated as unnecessarily strict
and overly burdensome. Specifically, the nuncupative will—that is, the
will by public declaration—surely impressed upon the testator and the
witnesses that the document was the testator’s will. In early Roman times,
this type of will also required wax tablets and a fictitious sale, as well as a
piece of bronze that was used to strike a balance prior to a declaration that
the testator made before five Roman citizens beyond the age of puberty,
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
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whereby he stated: “I do give and bequeath, and declare that I do so,
everything written in these tablets and this wax, and do you, Roman
citizens bear witness to my act.”545
Happily, the Roman system of will-making had changed completely
before the end of the Republic.546 Even more happily, in the few states that
maintain the publication requirement, the courts have read the requirement
so broadly as to almost jurisprudentially eradicate it. Some commentators
note that there “need be no express publication in the form of ‘this is my
will.’ Acts and signs may be sufficient.”547 Cases from other states indicate
that for the declaration to be sufficient, the witnesses must know that the
document is the testator’s will by some act of the testator, including
acquiescence by the testator to the statement of another that the document
is the testator’s will.548 Mere “[k]nowledge from another source will not
suffice.”549 Despite its seeming insignificance, the publication requirement
endures, and, much like the human appendix, its function and purpose
remain unknown.
D. The Attestation Clause
Whereas the publication requirement seems unnecessary but
innocuous, the requirement that a will contain an attestation clause has
been problematic in Louisiana for over 50 years. It is time—beyond
time—that this issue be remedied. Because the attestation clause is one of
the necessary prerequisites to the validity of a notarial will in Louisiana, it
is easy to lose sight of its general insignificance. It is a boilerplate
statement signed, but probably rarely read, by the witnesses and the notary
“attesting” to compliance with the will formalities. Under Civil Code
article 1577, the attestation clause must state: (1) that the testator indicated
that the relevant document was his will; (2) that the testator signed it at the
end of each page and at the end of the will; and (3) that the notary and
witnesses signed the stated attestation on the stated date in the presence of
the testator and each other. Although it would always be nice to have such
information spelled out in a will, it is hard to fathom the policy rationale
for invalidating a will that otherwise complies with all of the formalities
545. THE COMMENTARIES OF GAIUS ON THE ROMAN LAW 2.104 at 303–04
(1869); see also MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4, at 209.
546. NICHOLAS, supra note 174, at 254–55.
547. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 280; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
548. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 280; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 3.1 cmt. h.
549. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 280.
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but incorrectly recites the talismanic formula in the attestation clause. In
other words, imagine that the testator did actually (1) indicate that the
document was his will; (2) sign the will at the end of each page and at the
end of the will; and that (3) the notary and witnesses actually signed the
will in the presence of the testator and each other. Assume further that the
attestation clause was missing certain magic words, but that the witnesses
and the notary all testified that the will was otherwise properly executed.
Still, under article 1577, the will would be invalid, and the testator would
likely die intestate.
Similar circumstances occurred in Howard v. Gunter, a case from the
1960s in which a statutory will that was otherwise valid contained a
statement by the notary indicating only that the will was “Sworn to and
signed in the presence of me, Notary, and the [sic] these competent
witnesses on this the 10th day of June, 1953. L.H. Mizell Notary
Public.”550 In adopting the language and rationale of the lower court, the
court of appeal noted that “‘[i]n the present case, there is in reality no
attestation clause within the apparent contemplation of the statute that such
clause embrace a certification on behalf of all parties, the testator,
witnesses, and notary. Instead, there is only the certification of the
notary.’”551 Accordingly, the will was held invalid.552
Citing an earlier appellate court case, Succession of Brown, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Successions of Toney made clear that a proper
attestation clause contains three requirements:
The attestation clause set forth in the statute . . . requires the notary
and witnesses to declare (1) the testator signed the will at its end
and on each separate page, (2) the testator declared in the presence
of the notary and witnesses that it (the instrument) was his will,
and [(]3) in the presences of the testator and each other, they (the
notary and witnesses) signed their names on a specified date.553
To the extent that an attestation clause fails to include one of the above
elements, it is defective and noncompliant. In Toney, the testator’s will
failed to fully meet each of the three requirements because: (1) the testator
initialed the pages rather than signed them; (2) the notary failed to attest
that the testator declared the instrument to be his will, but the witnesses
did; and (3) the witnesses failed to declare that they signed in the presence

550.
551.
552.
553.
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of the notary.554 Although all of these deviations seem incredibly
insignificant, the Court found the deviations to be “significant and
material” and thus invalidated the will.555
Thankfully, two very recent court opinions from the same court on the
same day have taken a very practical and sensible approach to
noncompliance.556 In Succession of Hanna, decided on June 26, 2019, the
Second Circuit upheld a will that contained the following attestation
clause:
SIGNED AND DECLARED by testator above named in our
presence to be his last will and testament and in the presence of
the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names
on the 18th day of October, 2012 at Jonesboro, Louisiana.
Most notably, the attestation clause “does not contain a declaration by the
witnesses and notary that the testator signed the will at its end and on each
of its separate pages.”557 In distinguishing prior cases, including Toney, the
court noted that there was only a single minor deviation in this case and
not a multitude of errors, as in previous cases. Moreover, the court
appropriately observed that there was no suggestion of fraud in this case,
that the testator’s signature appeared at the end of the will and on each
separate page, and that the witnesses and notary were present at the
execution ceremony.
Similarly, in Succession of Pesnell, also decided on June 26, 2019, by
the Second Circuit, the court upheld a will containing the following
attestation clause:
The Testator, THOMAS EDROE PESNELL, has signed this his
Last Will and Testament at the end thereof, and has declared or
signified in our presence that it is his Last Will and Testament and
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. See also Succession of Pelfrey, 248 So 3d 607 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2018)
(upholding a will and concluding that the attestation clause was in substantial
compliance, even though the will “contained two attestation clauses, one for the
decedent and one for the notary and two witnesses”). The Pelfrey case is
consistent with prior jurisprudence. See Succession of Hebert, 101 So. 3d 131 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2012) (upholding a will with a split attestation clause), overruled
on other grounds by Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397; Succession of
Edwards, 619 So. 1249 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is well settled in
Louisiana jurisprudence that a ‘split’ attestation clause can be valid if it complies
with the requirements” of the law.); Succession of Eck, 93 So. 2d 181 (La. 1957).
557. Succession of Hanna, 277 So. 3d 438, 441 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019).
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in the presence of the Testator and each other we have hereunto
subscribed our names on this the 19th day of November, 2014.558
Once again, what is clearly missing is a statement attesting that the testator
signed each page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and the notary.
The reasoning by the court is rather abbreviated. In total, the court stated
as follows:
We note that although it is the best practice to use the sample
declaration provided in La. C.C. art. 1577(2), the legislature does
not mandate that this language be used. Although the attestation
clause does not contain the phrase “on each other separate page,”
we find that this deviation is non-material in this case where the
Testator’s signature appears on each page of the three-page
document and where the notary and witnesses attested to the
Testator signing at the end of the document. We emphasize that
there is a presumption in favor of the validity of testaments and
find that the nonobservance of formalities in this case is not
exceptionally compelling as to rebut that presumption.
Just a few months later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
its commitment to the holdings in Hanna and Pesnell. In Succession of
Liner, the court upheld the validity of a will, despite an attestation clause
that did not recite that the will had been signed “at the end and on each
other separate page.”559 The court reasoned that the testator had actually
signed the will at the end and on each page and that the attestation clause
“substantially complies” with the requirements of article 1579 of the
Louisiana Civil Code.560
Although well-reasoned and agreeable in outcome, these cases do not
contain evidence of testimony that the witnesses saw the testator sign each
page, and one is left wondering if signatures on each page were added at
the ceremony or thereafter. Moreover, if deviation for one “minor” error
is allowable, why would additional “minor” errors that are equally
insignificant produce a different result? After all, in Toney, the Court in
assessing the mistakes made by the testator, noted that “although the third
page of the will states it ‘was signed in our [the three witnesses’] sight and

558. Succession of Pesnell, 2019 WL 2607614 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019).
559. Succession of Liner, 285 So. 3d 63 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019), writ
granted, 2020 WL 965666 (La. 2020).
560. Id. at 68.
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presence,’ it does not mention that the will was signed on each separate
page as specified in the sample attestation clause.”561
Despite the progressive approach taken by the Second Circuit in the
above cases, Hanna, Pesnell, and Liner unfortunately should not be read
as the beginning of a new age of liberalization in will formalities. In
October of 2019, just days after the Liner opinion was decided, the
Louisiana Supreme Court issued a brief per curiam opinion reversing the
court of appeal in Hanna and, based upon Successions of Toney, concluded
that “the attestation clause . . . materially deviated from the requirements
of La. C.C. art. 1577(2) so as to render the testament invalid.”562 To make
matters even more confused, the Court denied the writ application in
Pesnell a mere 10 days before issuing its opinion in Hanna, leaving the
court of appeal opinion in Pesnell to stand.563
Subsequent appellate court cases have also unfortunately continued
the approach of rigid adherence to the wording of the attestation clause
found in the Civil Code. In Succession of Booth, the Third Circuit reversed
a trial court’s judgment ordering that the wills of two testators were “valid”
and “executed according to law.”564 According to the court, both wills
were absolute nullities because “the attestation clauses . . . lack[ed] the
language that the wills were signed in the presence of the witnesses and
the notary on each page.”565 Furthermore, in Succession of Bruce, the
Third Circuit invalidated a will merely because the attestation clause did
not recite that the testator signed the will “at the end.”566 Somewhat
unbelievably, the court came to this conclusion even though the testator
had actually signed the will at the end and on every page.567 Nonetheless,
561. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397, 405 (La. 2017) (emphasis in
original).
562. Succession of Hanna, 283 So. 3d 493 (La. 2019). But see id. (Weimer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Hanna case involved a single legal issue, unlike
Toney, which involved multiple issues of noncompliance, and suggesting that the
case should be docketed for full consideration).
563. Succession of Pesnell, 280 So. 3d 600 (La. 2019). On February 26, 2020,
the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liner. See 2020 WL 965666
(La. 2020).
564. Succession of Booth, 285 So. 3d 1, 2 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
565. Id. at 6. Importantly, in Booth, the court noted that there was “no dispute
that Mr. and Mrs. Booth [also] failed to sign two pages of their wills.” Id.
566. Succession of Bruce, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 283525 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2020). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case on June
22, 2020. See Succession of Bruce, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 3446903. It is hoped
that the Court will help realign Louisiana law from “strict” compliance to
“substantial” compliance in this area.
567. Succession of Bruce, 2020 WL 283525 at *4.
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according to the court, “strict adherence regarding the will’s attestation
clause is required for a will to be found to be in compliance,” and the
“words ‘at the end’ do not appear in the will’s attestation clause.”568
The strict compliance by courts to the talismanic language of the
attestation clause is curious for multiple reasons. First, article 1577 itself
provides that the exact words contained in the article are not required and
that a clause that is “substantially similar” will suffice.569 Although rules
are rules, nothing requires these rules to be applied in a rigid way that
disregards the practical consequences of doing so. Second, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has long ago noted that the attestation clause has only
“evidentiary,” rather than substantive, value.570 In Succession of Porche,
the Court noted that “the purpose of the attestation clause is primarily to
evidence, at the time the will was executed, that the statutory formalities
have been satisfied.”571 The Court continued by noting that when “the
instrument as a whole shows that these formalities have been satisfied, we
see no reason why technical variations in the attestation clause—which is
designed merely to evidence compliance with the formalities—should
defeat the dispositive portions of an otherwise valid will.”572 Moreover,
“[t]he principal function of the witnesses in the attestation requirement is
to supply a source of proof that the testator signed what he formally
indicated to be his testament.”573 Alas, Louisiana seems to have lost sight
of this function. The notarial will—and the statutory will from which the
notarial will was taken—was meant as “a means of evading the rigid
standards of form required of civil law testaments.”574 Today, however,
the notarial will seems to have taken on a rigid stricture of its own.
Louisiana is the only state to require an attestation clause as a
condition of validity for a will.575 The attestation clause originated in the
568. Id. But see id. (Perry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the deviation in this
case was “minor”). See also Succession of Simms, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 859937
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2020) (Although the court of appeal dismissed the case and
remanded it because the judgment failed to contain proper “decretal language,”
the trial court’s judgment annulled a judgment probating a will where “the
attestation clause failed to sufficiently comply with the requirements” of
Louisiana Civil Code article 1577.).
569. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577(2).
570. Succession of Porche, 288 So. 2d 27 (La. 1973).
571. Id. at 29.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 30.
575. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (mistakenly stating that “no state
requires a will contain an attestation clause”); MCGOVERN, ET AL., supra note 4,
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statutory will requirements in the 1950s and derives from the common, but
not required, practice in other states in the 1950s when the statutory will
was adopted.576 Writing as far back as the 1940s, Atkinson, as a “practical
hint regarding [will] execution,” recommended that “every will should
contain an attestation clause,” but at the same time, he was quick to note
that “an attestation clause is not required for the validity of a will.”577
Rather, it can merely be “a valuable and desirable aid in the proof of facts
or execution.”578 According to the Restatement, the use of an attestation
clause “raises a rebuttable presumption of the truth of the recitals.”579 The
reason that the attestation clause was common, but not required, in the
common law was because “the attestation clause is prima facie evidence
of the facts which are recited therein.”580
The original statutory will legislation and the current law on notarial
wills requires that the notary and witnesses sign a statement that the
testator appropriately signed the will and declared the instrument to be his
will in the presence of the witnesses and notary and that the witnesses and
notaries signed their names in the presence of the testator and each other.581
The usual common law form of attestation in the 1950s was as follows:
On this 28th day of March, 1950, the foregoing instrument was
signed, sealed, published and declared by John W. Jones, the
above-named testator, as and for his last will and testament, in our
presence and the presence of each of us, and we thereupon, at his
request, in his presence and in the presence of each other, have
hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses.582
The closest civil law analogue to the common law attestation clause is
the notarial paraph often included before the notary’s signature on
notarized documents. Spanish law requires a notary to state the place,
month, and day of the document and to certify that he knows or has
at 212 (“No state requires that wills contain an attestation clause, but their use is
generally recommended by attorneys.”).
576. See WILLIAM J. GRANGE ET AL., WILLS, EXECUTORS, AND TRUSTEES: A
PRACTICAL WORK ON THE LAW, ADMINISTRATION, AND ACCOUNTING OF
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 47 (1950).
577. ATKINSON, supra note 176, at 296, 301.
578. Id. at 296.
579. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. q (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
580. Id.; SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 19.141, at 250; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. q.
581. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577.
582. GRANGE, supra note 576, at 47.
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identified the testator, who he believes has capacity.583 Italian law also
requires that the notary state that the parties complied with all of the
formalities and provide the date and time of the signature and the place
where the will was received.584 Although Hungarian law previously
required an attestation clause, the Hungarian Civil Code of 1960 abolished
the requirement.585 Louisiana, in its rigid insistence on an overly technical
attestation clause, appears to stand alone.
VI. SPECIAL NOTARIAL WILLS
Articles 1578 to 1580.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code provide for
various alternative forms of notarial wills for testators with certain
disabilities that would prevent them from otherwise making a notarial will
under article 1577. Many of these articles are undoubtedly beneficial
additions that make wills available to those who, under prior law, may
have had difficulty executing the proper will forms.
A. Literate and Sighted but Physically Unable to Sign
Because the signature requirement is so important in Louisiana law, a
special provision was needed to accommodate someone who was unable
to sign because of physical infirmity. The basic requirements of a signed
writing from article 1577 are still required, but the execution of the will is
altered. Under article 1578, in place of a signature, a testator may “affix
his mark” or “direct another to assist him in affixing a mark, or to sign his
name in his place.”586 Similarly, the language in the required attestation
clause that is signed by the witnesses and the notary is altered to reflect
the modification in the procedure for execution.587
The declaration required by the testator and the specifics of the
attestation clause in article 1578 are held by courts to be quite important.
In Succession of Bilyeu, the court, in applying the substantially similar
provision of prior law, noted that the testator is required to “declare or
signify his physical inability and that the attestation clause reflect his
583. Lapuente, Testamentary Formalities in Spain, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 79.
584. Braun, Testamentary Formalities in Italy, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 132. Even in Italy, however, failure to comply
with these requirements makes the will only voidable, not void. Id.
585. Vékás, Testamentary Formalities in Hungary, in TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 268.
586. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1578.
587. Id.
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declaration.”588 The declaration was easily established in Bilyeu when the
attorney publicly questioned the testator, and the testator, after becoming
exasperated by trying to sign his name, declared that he could not.589 In
other cases, however, courts have noted that the declaration can be “a sign
or gesture, such as a nod, a grunt, or a series of eye movements.”590
In Succession of Maquar, the court invalidated a will executed less
than six months after the new provision in article 1578 took effect. In
Maquar, a testator, who was unable to sign his name and instead signed
with an “X,” failed to declare to the notary and witnesses that he could see
and read and failed to include a statement that he could see and read in the
attestation clause.591 In invalidating the will, the court noted that the
attestation clause in the testator’s will complied with the requirements of
the prior law for executing wills, but it failed to include the phrase “see
and read” as required by the new law.592 The harshness of the result in the
Maquar case is compounded by the fact that, as is so often the case, there
were “no allegations of fraud, mistake, undue influence, or that the testator
was unable to see or read at the time the testament was executed.”593
Nonetheless, the will was held invalid.
Far from being an outlier, the same holding was reaffirmed in
Succession of Breaux, whereby the court invalidated a testament made
pursuant to article 1578 by a testator who had brain cancer.594 In Breaux,
the testator appeared to have included an appropriate attestation clause
pursuant to article 1578, but the evidence suggested that the testator did
not, as was required, “declare or signify that he was able to see, read, and
knew how to sign his name but was unable to do so because of a physical
infirmity.”595 Acknowledging that its decision “may seem to be harsh,” the
court followed the reasoning of Maquar and concluded that the result was
“legislatively mandated.”596
588. Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
589. Id; see also Succession of Fletcher, 653 So.2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1995) (finding that a testator executing a statutory will was required to declare or
signify his inability to sign due to a physical impairment but was not required to
provide further information in the testament itself).
590. Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d at 58; see also Succession of Chopin,
214 So. 2d 248 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1968) (finding that the declaration regarding
impairment may be by sign or gesture).
591. Succession of Maquar, 849 So. 2d 773 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003).
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Succession of Breaux, 992 So. 2d 497 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008).
595. Id.
596. Id.
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Unlike in Maquar and Breaux, the court in Succession of Watson
upheld a will in which the decedent stated that she wished to avail herself
of the provisions of article 1578, but she failed to write the prescribed
wording of the altered attestation clause from that article.597 Instead, the
testator appeared to properly execute a will under article 1577, in which
she signed at the end and at the bottom of every page.598 The court noted
that because “the decedent could sign her full name, and in fact, did,” it
declined to find the will invalid under article 1578, as it was valid pursuant
to article 1577.599
B. Unable to Read
Just as the law provides special rules for those who are unable to sign
their name, so too does it prescribe rules for will-making for those unable
to read. The jurisprudence is replete with cases indicating that the ability
to read is a requirement of testamentary capacity.600 As a result, a special
rule for testators who are either sight impaired or illiterate was needed.
Article 1579 fills that gap.601 Like article 1578, article 1579 builds upon
article 1577 on notarial wills and provides a special execution procedure
for a testator who “does not know how to read, or is physically impaired
to the extent that he cannot read, whether or not he is able to sign his
name.”602 Unlike article 1578, which merely tweaks the declaration and
attestation clause, article 1579 provides a separate procedure whereby the
will of a testator is read aloud in his presence because the testator is unable
to read the document for himself.603 The witnesses follow along, and, after
597. Succession of Watson, 253 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2018).
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Succession of Young, 692 So. 2d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997);
Succession of Barranco, 657 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995); Succession
of Fletcher, 653 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995); Succession of Dorand,
596 So. 2d 411 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992); Succession of Littleton, 391 So. 2d
944 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Succession of Arnold, 375 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1979).
601. Article 1579 encourages wide application by noting that a testator who
could utilize either article 1577 or article 1578 to make a will can also utilize the
procedure proscribed in article 1579 to execute a notarial testament. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1579(4).
602. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1579.
603. Id. Current law no longer requires the notary to read the will to the testator
but acknowledges that someone other than the notary may perform the reading.
Under prior law, the jurisprudence had held that the reading of a will by a witness
rather than the notary substantially complied with the requirements of a statutory
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the reading, the testator declares that he heard the reading and that it
accords with his wishes.604 He then signs the will in the ordinary process,
and the notary and the witnesses sign a modified attestation clause
reflecting what occurred at the will execution ceremony.605
This type of will is based upon the prior law in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2443.606 The jurisprudence has made clear that inability to
read does not mean that the testator has vision problems or merely a
difficulty in reading. A “testator who can only read his will with his
eyeglasses is ‘able to read’ within the statute, and the testator who can only
read his will with a five-power or stronger magnifying lens is also ‘able to
read.’”607 A court has found that a testator was able to read if, although his
eyesight is failing, he is able to “get around in his house and in his hospital
room” and he can “see well enough to sign his name properly on the
designated line of the will.”608 Also, in Succession of Lanasa, the court
held that a testator who was “unable to read with the naked eye or with
glasses due to his severe macular degeneration” but who could read with
a reading machine was not required to make a will utilizing the special
procedure in article 1579. Instead, the testator could make an ordinary
notarial will under article 1577.609 Because the general notarial will
provision—and the statutory one before it—does not require a testator to
read his will, it is “immaterial that [the will’s witnesses] testified that the
testator did not use any magnifying device in order to read the will at the
time of its signing.”610 If, however, the testator is actually unable to read
and does not utilize the procedure provided in article 1579, then his will is
absolutely null.611
will when the notary testified that he had allergies and an asthma condition that
prevented him from reading the testament to the testator. See Succession of
Harvey, 573 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
604. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1579.
605. Id.
606. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2443 (repealed). Interestingly, in instances in which
the testator was also unable to sign, prior law required that he “declare or signify
the cause that hinders him from signing.” Id.
607. Succession of Harris, 329 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
608. Succession of Smith, 261 So. 2d 679 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
609. Succession of Lanasa, 948 So. 2d 288 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2006).
610. Succession of Polk, 940 So. 2d 895, 910 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006).
611. Succession of Graham, 803 So. 2d 195 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2001). See
also Succession of Armand, __ So. 3d __, 2020 WL 944473 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2020) (disqualifying lawyers who drafted the will from testifying as to the
decedent’s ability to read when the validity of the decedent’s will was challenged
by asserting that the decedent was legally blind and the attestation clause did not
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C. Braille
Article 1580 of the Louisiana Civil Code allows for a will to be
executed in braille. This article thus allows those who are sight impaired
but can read braille to execute a will. This new article “reproduces the
substance of R.S. 9:2444,” which allowed for statutory wills in braille
form.612 There are no reported cases under this article and very little
secondary commentary. It is uncertain to what extent this type of will has
been utilized.
D. Deaf or Deaf and Blind
By its terms, article 1580.1 purports to provide a mechanism for the
execution of a will by one who is either deaf or deaf and blind. Although
the goal of article 1580.1 is laudable, its applicability remains unclear. The
current article was added in 1999, but after the law of donations revision,
which occurred in 1997. Due to the delayed effective date of the general
revision to the law of donations, article 1580.1 took effect at the same time
as the other revisions—July 1, 1999.
Prior to the effective date of the donations revision, the Louisiana State
Law Institute recognized a gap in the law for testators who were unable to
both hear and see.613 Consequently, a “technical corrections bill” for a
number of overlooked items was prepared in the form of House Bill 932
of 1999.614 The text of House Bill 932 seemed sensible enough. It provided
as follows:
A testator who is unable to hear and is also unable to read may
execute a notarial testament in the form provided in this Article if
he can communicate his intention to execute a testament and the
dispositions of his testament to a notary public in the presence of
two competent witnesses in a manner of communication that is
understood by the notary and the witnesses.615
In other words, House Bill 932 did not prescribe a particular form of
communication between the testator and the notary and witnesses, but it
recite that the will was read aloud in the presence of the testatrix and the
witnesses).
612. Succession of Graham, 803 So. 2d 195; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1580 cmt.
613. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations § 12.4, in 10
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2009).
614. H.B. 932, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999).
615. Id.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 432

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

WILL FORMALITIES IN LOUISIANA

1421

instead allowed for flexibility in any manner that “is understood by the
notary and the witnesses.”616 The testator’s desires would then be “reduced
to writing” and “read aloud” by the notary to the witnesses, who would
follow along on copies.617 Of course, the testator would not be able to hear
the reading, given his impairment, but the witnesses would hear it, and the
testator had communicated his original intentions in the witnesses’
presence.618 After the reading, the notary and the witnesses were required
to communicate to the testator that the dispositions recited were the same
as those he communicated to them.619 The testator was then required to
communicate his satisfaction, and all the respective parties would sign the
document with an appropriate attestation clause.620 Some scholars have
noted that this “bill appeared uncontroversial and passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 91-0, [but] it died without a hearing in the
Senate Judiciary Committee.”621
Instead, Act 745 of 1999, which was not a Law Institute product, was
prepared by Senator Landry and ultimately enacted as article 1580.1.622
Because article 1580.1 was added outside of the Law Institute process, the
article contains no comments to aid in its interpretation or application. If
the point of article 1580.1 is to cover the gap for testators who cannot hear
and see, it is unclear how it accomplishes its purpose. By its terms, it
applies “only [to] a person who has been legally declared physically deaf
or deaf and blind and who is able to read sign language, braille, or visual
English.”623
First, it is unclear why a “legal declar[ation]” of deafness or deafness
and blindness is required. As explained below, article 1580.1 is not the
only type of will that can be made by those who are sight impaired. So,
why create an alternative method of will-making only for those for who
have been “legally declared” deaf or deaf and blind? Because article
1580.1 purports to provide a method available “only” to a person who has
been “legally declared physically deaf or deaf and blind,” it is presumably
not available to those who are deaf or deaf and blind but do not possess a
legal declaration to that effect.
Second, although the article purports to provide how such a will “shall
be prepared,” it does anything but provide clarity. Whereas articles 1578
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
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to 1580 build upon the foundational requirements for a notarial will
provided in article 1577 and establish special execution requirements for
the various alternatives, article 1580.1 is different insofar as it states both
a method of preparation and execution of a will. It states that “[t]he
notarial testament shall be prepared and shall be dated and executed in the
following manner.”624 Notably absent is a statement that the will must be
“prepared in writing,” although, once again, the strange obsession with the
date appears.625 One might infer a writing requirement from other
requirements that the “instrument” be “sign[ed] . . . at the end of the
testament and on each other separate page,” but inference is hardly a
preferable way to delineate the drafting requirements for wills, which must
be observed under the penalty of nullity. Although the article purports to
provide a will that is available to someone who is “legally declared
physically deaf or deaf and blind” and “who is able to read sign language,
braille, or visual English,” it does not provide that a will can be
communicated to the notary and witnesses in sign language, braille, or
visual English and then transcribed by them into writing. In fact, the article
provides no method of preparation at all. Rather, article 1580.1 lists a
series of specific requirements for the testator’s declaration and for the
witnesses’ and notary’s attestation clause, all of which presuppose that
there is some “instrument” to be “signed” by the testator. In fact,
subsection (C) of article 1580.1 seems to suggest that the only virtue of
this article is not that it allows a method of preparation or execution of a
will for a testator who is deaf or deaf and blind, but that it provides a
special way for the testator to communicate with the notary and witnesses
that the relevant instrument is the testator’s will.626 Subsection (C) of
article 1580.1 provides that “the testator shall declare or signify by sign or
visual English to [the notary and two competent witnesses] that the
instrument is his last testament.”627 But nothing in legislation or
jurisprudence, however, prescribes a particular method of communication
by a testator who executes a notarial will under article 1577.
Third, it is unclear why “blind[ness]” is included in this article at all.
At the time of enactment of article 1580.1, the revision already contained
two proposals for the execution of wills for those who had difficulty
reading. Under article 1579, a will can be read aloud in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses, who would then all sign, with the testator
624. Id.
625. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1580.1, with id. art. 1577.
626. But see id. art. 1580.1(D) (stating that attestation clause “shall be prepared
in writing,” suggesting, perhaps, by a contrario reasoning that the rest of will need
not be).
627. Id. art. 1580.1(C)(1)–(2).
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attesting that the reading constituted the substance of his will and the
witnesses attesting to the testator’s attestation. Similarly, article 1580, as
previously mentioned, allows for the execution of a will in braille for those
able to read braille. For those who are deaf and blind, clearly article 1579
would not be appropriate because they would be unable to hear the
reading. Provided, of course, a testator could read braille, a will under
article 1580 is available. Nonetheless, article 1580.1 purports to make
available another form of will for those who are “legally declared deaf or
deaf and blind and who [are] able to read sign language, braille, or visual
English.”628 For those can read braille, this article seems duplicative. For
those who are deaf, but not blind, the traditional notarial will is available,
which requires reading and signing, but not hearing. For those who are
deaf and blind, it is unclear how they would still be able “to read sign
language . . . or visual English.”
Although article 1580.1 appears to make available another form of
will-making for those who are “legally declared physically deaf”—that is,
sign language—it should be remembered that there is no requirement
under article 1577 for the ordinary notarial will that the testator be able to
hear. He needs only to know how and be able to read and sign his name
and, in some way, signify that the instrument he is signing is his will.
Worse yet, article 1580.1 imposes additional requirements for the drafting
of the attestation clause, including the signification by the testator that the
document is his will by sign language or visual English and that at least
one of the witnesses be “a certified interpreter for the deaf.”629 These
requirements are unfortunate because many people may know and
understand sign language and be able to communicate with a hearingimpaired testator. Nothing requires a testator who speaks only French, for
example, to execute his will with an attestation clause reciting that he
communicated with the notary and witnesses in French. Then why impose
this requirement on testators who communicate by sign language?
Moreover, nothing requires a witness to a will executed by a Frenchspeaking testator to be certified or credentialed in the French language.
Then, why impose this requirement on hearing-impaired testators?
Perhaps the only virtue of article 1580.1 is that it does not require a
hearing-impaired testator to make use of it to effectively execute a will.
Article 1580.1, as written, is an alternative to article 1577 for certain
hearing-impaired testators, not an exclusive provision that must be utilized
by them. It is difficult to imagine why a hearing-impaired testator would
choose the more onerous route of 1580.1 rather than the ordinary one
628. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1580.1.
629. Id.
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under article 1577. There are no reported cases applying or interpreting
article 1580.1 and no secondary commentary that sheds light upon its
usage. Its application and necessity remain elusive.
VII. THE LAW OF TOMORROW: THE COMING OF DIGITAL OR
ELECTRONIC WILLS?
As should be evident from the above discussion, the laws on will
formalities in Louisiana are some of the most restrictive and detailed in
the United States. As such, it is unlikely that Louisiana would legislatively
embrace a broad conception of an electronic will at this time, although four
states and now a uniform act specifically provide for the regulation and
use of this new form of will.630 The laws among this handful of states
recognize that electronic wills exhibit a substantial amount of variation,
some of which is explored below. Suffice it to say, however, that before
embarking upon a review of these laws, an understanding of what
constitutes an electronic will is necessary.
A. What Is an Electronic Will?
The term “electronic will” is subject to a variety of interpretations and
could include a range of transactions from a document written on a tablet
with a stylus to a typed document that is electronically stored and signed
not with a traditional cursive signature, but with a symbol, process, or
identifying key.631 Under one state law, an electronic will is defined as a
will that “is initially created and maintained as an electronic record; . . .
contains the electronic signatures of . . . the testator . . . and . . . the attesting
witnesses; and . . . contains the date and times of the electronic signatures”
previously described.632 Some of the instances of what can be considered
an electronic will, such as in the Castro case, mentioned above, can be
adequately handled under the traditional law by undertaking an
examination of whether the testator has adequately “signed” a document
630. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085; FLA. REV. STAT. § 732.522; ARIZ. STAT. §
14-2518; IND. CODE § 26-2-8-102; UNIF. ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT (July 17,
2019).
631. See What Is an “Electronic Will”?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1791 (2018)
(noting that “[a]s used today, an electronic will could mean any writing along a
broad spectrum from a will simply typed into a word-processing program by the
testator on a computer and stored on its hard drive to a will signed by the testator
with an authenticated digital signature, witnessed or notarized via webcam, and
stored by a for-profit company.”) (footnote omitted).
632. IND. STAT. § 29-1-21-3(10).
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or whether the act executed by the testator constitutes a “writing.” Other
situations involving wills hosted on various platforms and utilizing
identifying data or markers in place of signatures do not easily fit within
existing law and might necessitate special legislation, if they are to be
allowed. It is the latter situation that most of the new legislation addresses.
B. Existing Law
To date, only a few states have undertaken to enact special legislation
concerning electronic wills. Although legislatures in other states have
introduced legislation, cautionary forces have prevailed, and the proposals
have not been enacted.633 Even in some of the states with legislation on
electronic wills, the path to legislation has not always been a smooth one.
In several cases, legislation was enacted only after having been defeated
the year before. Irrespective of past practices, it seems likely that with the
advance of technology and now a new uniform act, enactment of special
legislation is likely to grow.
1. Nevada and Florida
In 2001, Nevada was the first adopter of the electronic will
legislation—perhaps as an example of the law getting ahead of the needs
and desires of the citizenry. One scholar has noted that the original Nevada
law was “groundbreaking,” but “the technology necessary to create an
electronic will in compliance with the law was not yet in existence.”634 As
a result, the law was “never used.”635 Commentators have observed that
the statute was designed with tech-savvy California clients in mind, but
the technology that the legislature had envisioned did not materialize until
years later.636 To begin with, the original Nevada statute required that the
will be “written, created and stored in an electronic record” and that it
633. See, e.g., S.B. 40, 2017 N.H. Leg. Sess.; H.B. 1403, 2018 Va. Leg. Sess.
For an overview of the various state statutes and proposals, see Jennifer L. Fox,
Twenty-First Century Wills, 33 PROB. & PROP. 52 (2019). For a critical
assessment of electronic wills and a proposal to allow them only in emergency
situations, see Adam J. Hirsch, Technology Adrift: In Search of a Role for
Electronic Wills, 61 B.C. L. REV. 827 (2020).
634. Gerry W. Beyer & Katherine V. Peters, Sign on the [Electronic] Dotted
Line: The Rise of the Electronic Will, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES LAW EJOURNAL
(Nov. 29, 2018).
635. Id. at 2.
636. Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come
for Wills to Join the Digital Revolution, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 888 (2007).
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contain “the date and the electronic signature of the testator and which
includes, without limitation, at least one authentication characteristic of
the testator.”637 An “authentication characteristic” meant something that
was “capable of measurement and recognition in an electronic record as a
biological aspect of or physical act performed by that person,” such as “a
fingerprint, a retinal scan, voice recognition, facial recognition, a digitized
signature or other authentication using a unique characteristic of the
person.”638 Although such technology exists today, it was not readily
available in 2001. Moreover, the statute required that “only one
authoritative copy” exist, which was defined as “the original, unique,
identifiable and unalterable electronic record of an electronic will.”639
Writing in 2007, one commentator noted that “[b]ecause computers are the
perfect copying machine, every copy is a perfect copy, indistinguishable
from the original, making it very easy to make changes and very hard to
prove which version of a file is the original.”640 The Nevada legislation,
which was “developed during the tech boom of the 1990s [] anticipated
that the necessary software would soon be available,” but such was not the
case.641
The Nevada law was amended in 2017, in part to make the law more
attractive, easy to use, compatible, and accessible. The new law still
requires an “authentication characteristic” of the testator, but now
fingerprint technology and facial recognition software are commonplace.
Moreover, the “authentication characteristic” is no longer a requirement in
addition to witnesses and a signature of the testator, but as an alternative
method of validation.642 The new law has also abandoned the idea that
there must be one and only one “authoritative copy.” Although the exact
number of electronic wills is unclear, at least one has been executed: An
organization known as Trust & Will issued a press release on January 24,
2019, announcing that they had executed “the first digital will for Cory
McCormick, a police officer in Nevada.”643
Although Nevada was the first, it is no longer the only jurisdiction to
authorize electronic wills. Florida law also now permits electronic wills.
637. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2001).
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Beyer & Peters, supra note 651, at 2.
641. Id.
642. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085.
643. Danny Tabatabai, Trust & Will Closes First Electronic Will in the US (Plus
$2m Investment), EXTRA CRUNCH DAILY, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/24/trustwill-closes-first-electronic-will-in-the-us-plus-2m-investment/ [https://perma.cc/5
ARX-HH3Y].
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The introduction of the electronic will into Florida law was not, however,
without controversy. In June of 2017, the Florida legislature approved
House Bill 277, which authorized electronic wills. The governor at the
time, Rick Scott, vetoed the bill and published a letter explaining his
reservations with the proposed legislation.644 In his letter, Governor Scott
outlined three concerns. First, he stated that “the remote notarization
provisions in the bill do not adequately ensure authentication of the
identity of the parties” and thus increase the likelihood of fraud or
exploitation of vulnerable citizens utilizing the legislation.645 Second, the
proposed legislation would increase the burden on the Florida court
system, especially if, as proposed, the Florida law allowed for the probate
of the wills of non-Floridians who utilized the law.646 Third, the bill had a
delayed effectiveness date so as to address “substantive changes and
outstanding questions,” which the governor felt should be addressed in a
comprehensive bill during the next session.647
Over the objection of the Real Property Probate and Trust Section of
the Florida Bar,648 in June of 2019, the Florida Legislature again passed a
bill, House Bill 409, authorizing electronic wills. Governor Scott,
however, had since left his post and taken up a position as a United States
Senator for Florida. The new governor, Ron DeSantis, signed the bill,
which has now become law. Under the new law, which is a comprehensive
enactment on electronic signatures, an individual can execute a will that is
witnessed by individuals who are not physically present with the testator
but are in communication with the testator through “audio-video
communication technology.”649 In place of witnesses, a Florida testator
may validly execute an electronic will before a notary who is in audiovideo communication with the testator, provided the testator provides
“verbal answers” to a series of questions regarding his location, age,
mental status, free consent, and the names of “everyone you know in the
room with you.”650 The Florida statute is unique, however, in providing
that “[t]he execution of an electronic will of a testator who is a vulnerable
adult . . . may not be witnessed by means of audio-video communication
644. Letter from Rick Scott to Ken Detzner (June 26, 2017) (on file with
author).
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Id.
648. See Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar,
White Paper on Proposed Enactment of the Florida Electronic Wills Act
(regarding the 2018 bill).
649. FLA. REV. STAT. § 732.522(3)(a).
650. Id. § 732.522(3)(b).
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technology.”651 Under Florida law, the definition of a “vulnerable adult”
is quite expansive and includes those “whose ability to perform the normal
activities of daily living or to provide for his or her own care or protection
is impaired due to a mental, emotional, sensory, long-term physical, or
developmental disability or dysfunction, or brain damage, or the
infirmities of aging.”652
2. Indiana and Arizona

Like Florida and Nevada, Indiana and Arizona also adopted electronic
will laws in 2018. Both the Indiana law and the Arizona law are more
conservative in approach. Just as in Florida, it took two attempts to get the
legislation passed in Indiana. Although the bill was not successful in 2017,
the governor of Indiana signed that state’s electronic wills law into effect
in March of 2018. Under the Indiana law, wills can be executed by means
of an “electronic signature,” defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or
process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the electronic
record.”653 This description is broader than the traditional definition of a
signature usually employed for wills. Unlike in Florida and Nevada,
however, in the execution of an electronic will in Indiana, “[t]he testator
and the attesting witnesses must be in each other’s actual presence when
the electronic signatures are made in or on the electronic will,” and “[t]he
testator and witnesses must directly observe one another as the electronic
will is being signed by the parties.”654
Similarly, Arizona passed an electronic wills act in 2017, but the
effectiveness of the act was delayed until July 1, 2019. Like the Indiana
law, the Arizona act allows for the will to be exclusively in electronic form
and to be electronically signed by the testator and two witnesses.655 An
electronic signature is defined as a “method or process that . . . [i]s attached
or logically associated with an electronic record and that is executed or
adopted by a person with intent to sign the electronic record” and that
“[u]ses a security procedure that allows a determination that the electronic
signature” sufficiently identifies the signer.656 The Arizona law is similar
to the Indiana law—and unlike the Florida and the Nevada laws—in

651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
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requiring that the witnesses be “physically present,” rather than merely
electronically present, when the testator signs or acknowledges the will.657
C. Uniform Electronic Wills Act
In July of 2019, the Uniform Law Commission approved a new
Uniform Electronic Wills Act.658 The drafting committee first met in
October of 2017 and gave three reasons for proceeding with the project:
(1) people want electronic wills for various reasons, including ease of
execution and cost savings; (2) people will try to execute wills
electronically anyway, as some cases had already started to percolate on
this issue, and electronic wills “are the new version of” holographic wills;
and (3) companies will draft bills for legislatures, and a uniform law
approach “could lead to some coherence around the country.”659 In the
words of the committee: “The Uniform Electronic Wills Act retains core
wills act formalities of writing, signature and attestation, but adapts them.
The will must exist in the electronic equivalent of text when it is
electronically signed.”660 The electronic will must be signed or
acknowledged in the presence of two witnesses or a notary.661
Additionally, the act adopts the traditionally broad definition of signing
associated with electronic documents. Namely, signing means executing,
adopting, affixing, or associating—with the present intent to authenticate
or adopt—a sound, symbol, or process to an electronic record.662 The new
act leaves it to states, however, to decide if they will require the witnessing
or notarization to be in either physical or electronic presence.663 In short,
the Uniform Electronic Wills Act does not dramatically alter the
foundational law for will-making but merely adapts it so that its provisions
are compatible with electronic execution.

657. Id.
658. UNIF. ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT (July 17, 2019).
659. Id.
660. Suzanne Brown Walsh, Turney P. Berry, & Susan N. Gary, Electronic
Wills Act (May 30, 2019), available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/Higher
Logic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=13b336c4-b84
2-c792-fe57-03eb3d97ef96&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/VY9A-FBGD]
661. UNIF. ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT § 5.
662. Id. § 2(6).
663. Id.
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D. Conflicts of Law Issues
The above discussion is important in Louisiana for two distinct
reasons. First, it foreshadows what may be in Louisiana’s future. As
technology continues to progress, it would be myopic to suggest that the
law on wills, or the law on any topic, will not or should not change to
accommodate this progress. Nonetheless, one must be careful not to rush
headlong into unchartered and potentially choppy waters without a good
reason to do so. Just because technology changes does not mean that the
law should necessarily incorporate these changes if the point or purpose
of the law is not served. After all, Betamax tapes and floppy disks were at
one point seen as cutting edge technology; it now seems wise that the law
did not change to allow wills to be executed through these media because
such a will would be almost unreadable today due to continued
technological change. Nonetheless, decisions on whether to change the
law to suit the latest technological advance should be thoughtfully
considered. Only by knowing what other states and technology provide
can one fully engage in such consideration.
The second, and perhaps more immediate, reason for electronic wills
to concern Louisiana lawyers is because courts and lawyers may encounter
them today, even without a specific Louisiana law on this topic.
Specifically, article 3528 of the Louisiana Civil Code on conflicts of law
provides that many wills executed outside of Louisiana may be probated
in Louisiana after the death of a testator.664 It states as follows:
A testamentary disposition is valid as to form if it is in writing and
is made in conformity with: (1) the law of this state; or (2) the law
of the state of making at the time of making; or (3) the law of the
state in which the testator was domiciled at the time of making or
at the time of death.665
Consider, for instance, a domiciliary of Florida, Nevada, Arizona, or
Indiana who executes an electronic will under the laws of his state and
then moves to Louisiana, where he subsequently establishes a domicile
and dies. Under article 3528, such a will would be valid in form and would
be subject to probate by a Louisiana court because the testator executed a
will in writing that was in compliance with the “law of the state in which
the testator was domiciled at the time of making.”666 Similarly, consider a
second testator who is a Louisiana domiciliary but decides to visit Florida,
664. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3528.
665. Id.
666. Id.
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Nevada, Arizona, or Indiana. While visiting, this Louisianian avails
himself of the laws of those particular states, executes an electronic will,
and then returns home and subsequently dies. Once again, under article
3528, the electronic will executed outside of Louisiana would be subject
to probate in Louisiana by a Louisiana court because the testator executed
a will in writing that was in compliance with “the law of the state of
making at the time of making.”667 The conflicts provision under the
Uniform Electronic Wills Act retains the above outcomes and notes that
an electronic will executed in compliance with the act is valid if it is
executed in compliance “with the law of the jurisdiction where: (1) the
testator is physically located when the will is signed; or (2) the testator is
domiciled or resides when the will is signed or when the testator dies.”668
As noted by the drafting committee, “[t]his is consistent with the current
law applicable to traditional wills and prevents the intestacy of a testator
who validly signs a will while living in a state that permits remote
execution, but moves to or just happens to die in a state that prohibits
them.”669
Although the above is a reminder that electronic wills have potentially
already arrived in Louisiana, a more controversial consideration also
exists. Consider the Louisiana domiciliary who, while residing and
remaining in Louisiana, goes online and executes an electronic will
pursuant to either the Florida or Nevada statutes. A traditional conflicts
analysis would suggest that such a will is not formally valid in Louisiana
because the will was not made in conformity with: (1) the law of this
state—Louisiana; (2) the law of the state of making at the time of
making—also Louisiana;670 or (3) the law of the state in which the testator
was domiciled at the time of making or at the time of death—again,
Louisiana. None of the conflicts provisions seem to make allowance in this
example for the applicability of Nevada or Florida law. Nevada law,
however, provides as follows:

667. Id.
668. UNIF. ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT § 4.
669. Walsh, Berry, & Gary, supra note 660.
670. Although the expression “the law of the state of making at the time of
making” is perhaps less than pellucid, comment (e) to article 3528 clarifies that
the reference to the “state of making” is a reference to “the pertinent law of the
place of making . . . in force at the time of making and not later.” LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3528 cmt. e (emphasis added). In other words, the applicable law in the above
example is whatever Louisiana law, i.e., “the place of making” since the testator
was in Louisiana at the time of making, was at the time the testator made his will,
i.e., “the time of making.”
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Regardless of the physical location of the person executing a
document . . . , if a document is executed electronically, the
document shall be deemed to be executed in this State and will be
governed by the laws of this State and subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State if (1) [t]he person executing the
document states that he or she understands that he or she is
executing, and that he or she intends to execute, the document in
and pursuant to the laws of this State; [and] (2) [t]he document
states that the validity and effect of its execution are governed by
the laws of this State.671
In other words, Nevada law has deemed a Louisiana domiciliary who,
while residing and remaining in Louisiana, goes online and executes an
electronic will in compliance with the Nevada statutes, to have executed
the will in Nevada. If that is the case, however, then one could argue that
the will is formally valid in Louisiana, as the law was in writing and
formally valid pursuant to the laws of the deemed state of making at the
time of making, that is, Nevada. The Florida statute provides similarly in
stating that “[a]n instrument that is signed electronically is deemed to be
executed in this state if the instrument states that the person creating the
instrument intends to execute and understands that he or she is executing
the instrument in, and pursuant to the laws of, this state.”672 Notably, this
is not the approach of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act, which:
[W]ould not validate the remotely executed, Nevada will of a
testator who signed it while living in a state (say, Connecticut)
which prohibits remote execution, if the will is later offered for
probate in Connecticut. It would, however, later require
Connecticut to admit the will to probate if it was signed remotely
while the testator lived in Nevada, which recognizes such wills.673
Despite the deemed presence statement in Nevada and Florida law, it
is possible—perhaps probable—that a Louisiana court would not give
effect to the fiction created by Florida or Nevada law that a Louisiana
domiciliary is deemed to be in Florida or Nevada at the time of execution.
Thus, a court would not apply Louisiana’s general conflicts rule and would
not give effect to the electronic will. Be that as it may, pursuant to Nevada
Revised Statutes § 133.088, the Louisiana domiciliary is “subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State”—that is, Nevada—suggesting that
671. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.088.
672. FLA. REV. STAT. § 732.522(4).
673. Walsh, Berry, & Gary, supra note 660.
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a Nevada court would probate the Louisiana domiciliary’s electronic will.
Of course, under Louisiana law, the Louisiana domiciliary’s movable
property would be subject to the law of Louisiana—that is, “the law of the
state in which the deceased was domiciled at the time of death”674—as
would his immovable property—that is, “the law of this state.”675 The
Uniform Electronic Wills Act recognizes that “some states will seek to
enforce [a] no remote wills policy by amending their wills acts not only
by prohibiting the remote execution of electronic wills in their state, but
also by refusing to recognize those that were validly executed out of
state.”676 To date, Louisiana has not undertaken this approach.
CONCLUSION
Although the above assessment has, in many ways, been critical of the
current law, many beneficial developments have occurred. The legislature
is to be commended for moving away from the Procrustean traditional
form requirements that dominated the law for most of the 20th century and
adopting, based largely upon comparative research, the simpler and easier
statutory and, eventually, notarial will. The courts have, in many instances,
grafted doctrines of flexibility, such as “substantial compliance,” that have
aided testators in enforcing their intent without at the same time
jeopardizing the virtues and purposes of form requirements.
Over the last 50 years, however, the positive law on form requirements
for wills has developed very little. The notarial and olographic wills are,
to a very great extent, the statutory and olographic wills of the 1950s. The
statutory will, which was adopted to provide a simpler form than had
previously been available for nuncupative wills, has now become a rigid
procedure that is applied in an inflexible, formalistic way. Requirements,
such as the date, the attestation clause, and the signing of every page of a
will—which serve little to no practical purpose—have served as a
shibboleth to allow only the initiated and chosen ones to successfully make
wills while, at the same time, denying the benefits to many. To make
matters worse, in the context of notarial wills, decedents are being forced
to die intestate not because of mistakes they make themselves but because
of errors on the part of their lawyers in the drafting of wills. The current
Louisiana law is not only ill-suited for modern day practice, but it is also
ill-equipped to contend with matters such as electronic wills and other
forms of wills that may develop in the future.
674. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3532.
675. Id. art. 3533.
676. Walsh, Berry, & Gary, supra note 660.
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Indeed, today—perhaps more than in the recent past—the purposes of
will formalities should be keenly kept in mind as an increasing number of
jurisdictions begin to reevaluate will formalities, such as the attestation
requirement, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the new importance
of social distancing. The Ministry of Justice in the United Kingdom, for
example, is currently reported to be “urgently look[ing] to change
requirements around witnessing wills in the wake of the coronavirus
outbreak.”677 Additionally, U.S. governors in a great number of states have
issued executive orders purporting to relax certain will formalities, such
as in-person witnessing.678 Even in Louisiana, several bills have been
introduced to allow for remote notarization of legal acts,679 and at least one
such bill would include wills within its ambit.680
When assessing the relevance of form requirements—whether during
a pandemic or not—the key consideration with form requirements should
never be blind obeisance; rather, it should always be that the requirements
be applied to the extent that their enforcement furthers their rationale or
underlying purposes.681 As one commentator aptly observed many years
ago, form requirements are not an end in themselves but only a means to
an end.682 As such, they should always be viewed by courts as “a vehicle
677. Jemma Slingo, Coronavirus: Talks Ongoing over Wills Witness
Requirements, LAW SOC. GAZETTE (Mar. 25, 2020), available at https://www.
lawgazette.co.uk/news/coronavirus-talks-ongoing-over-wills-witness-requirement
s/5103625.article [https://perma.cc/CT9M-UZU2]; see also Harry Brennan, Rules
to Be Relaxed to Allow Quick Military-Style Wills to Be Drawn Up Amid Covid-19
Surge, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 1, 2020), available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
money/consumer-affairs/rules-relaxed-allow-quick-military-style-wills-drawn-amidcovid/ [https://perma.cc/39BH-WUKF].
678. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order 202.14 (April 7, 2020) (providing that the act
of witnessing can be performed using certain types of audio-visual technology). For
a comprehensive and up-to-date listing of the various laws and executive orders
regarding remoted witnessing and notarization, see Emergency Remote
Notarization and Witnessing Orders, ACTEC (April 10, 2020), available at https://
www.actec.org/resources/emergency-remote-notarization-and-witnessing-orders/
?utm_source=Informz&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=ACTEC&_zs=Thp
AX&_zl=JKd32 [https://perma.cc/394K-RMQU].
679. H.B. 122, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2020), subsequently enacted into
Act No. 131, 2020 La. Acts; H.B. 274, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2020),
subsequently enacted into Act No. 254, 2020 La Acts; S.B. 472, 2020 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 2020).
680. S.B. 472, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).
681. Kolkman, Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 44, at 173.
682. Hawsey, supra note 270, at 461.
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which protects the testator and those inheriting under him from imposition,
fraud, and undue influence. When none of these evils are present, form has
served its function and the testament should not be struck with nullity.”683
Yet it would be unfair to lay all the blame at the feet of courts. As one
branch of government, the courts are charged with interpreting the laws,
not writing them. The legislature, too, must be cognizant of whether the
formalities adopted are not only serving the purposes for which they are
designed but also whether there are better ways to serve those purposes
without imposing an unjustifiable risk upon testators. As James Lindgren
has written, “If we required a secret handshake for willmaking that only
lawyers knew, that would serve the cautionary or ritual function.”684 It is
time for the secret handshake for will-making in Louisiana to change. It is
hoped that the above contribution will modestly serve to advance that goal.

683. Id.
684. Lindgren, supra note 23, at 1033; see also Fassberg, supra note 146, at
627.
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